University of Wisconsin Milwaukee

UWM Digital Commons
Theses and Dissertations

May 2014

3 Up, 3 Down: the Complex Relationship of
Professional Sports and Community Identity in
Brooklyn, Milwaukee, and Washington, D.C.
Peter Lund
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.uwm.edu/etd
Part of the Other History Commons, and the United States History Commons
Recommended Citation
Lund, Peter, "3 Up, 3 Down: the Complex Relationship of Professional Sports and Community Identity in Brooklyn, Milwaukee, and
Washington, D.C." (2014). Theses and Dissertations. 413.
https://dc.uwm.edu/etd/413

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by UWM Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an
authorized administrator of UWM Digital Commons. For more information, please contact open-access@uwm.edu.

3 UP, 3 DOWN: THE COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP OF PROESSIONAL SPORTS
AND COMMUNITY IDENTITY IN BROOKLYN, MILWAUKEE, AND
WASHINGTON, D.C.

by

Peter Lund

A Thesis Submitted in
Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts
in History

at
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
May 2014

ABSTRACT
3 UP, 3 DOWN: THE COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP OF PROESSIONAL SPORTS
AND COMMUNITY IDENTITY IN BROOKLYN, MILWAUKEE, AND
WASHINGTON, D.C.
by
Peter Lund

The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2014
Under the supervision of Professor Neal Pease

This paper seeks to understand the role that professional sports teams play in influencing
community identity. Specifically, it hypothesizes that community identity is one of the
main factors in cities choosing to provide public funds as subsidies for the construction of
sports stadiums and arenas. This influence is important, as economists generally accept
that stadiums do not provide the economic contributions that popular rhetoric presents as
justification for their construction. By looking at three cases where considerations of a
publicly funded stadium resulted in a city losing its professional team, the larger
discourse of public subsidies is augmented in complexity. While each case retains
distinctive features, all three cities share a common thread of contributing in some way to
the reinforcement of the stadium subsidization process.
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Introduction
It would be difficult – if not impossible – to tell a history of sport in any society
without also telling a history of economics. Sport especially has a history of elitism and
exclusionary constructs that are almost always based around a social hierarchy influenced
by economics, regardless of whether the dominant social form is patriarchal lineage or
pure purchasing power. In the ancient world, athletes occupied a social realm all their
own, existing as an “other” class that allowed an autonomous definition of standards and
conceptions of things like beauty. As Jason König explains, in order to make a living as
an athlete it was necessary to have the proper wealth, or at least the connection to it, to
pay for your rigorous daily training, an idea especially prevalent in the Greek East (Asia
Minor).1 This training took the place of a producing role in society, and thus the lack of
income required a connection to some sort of independent wealth. This requirement
restricted participation in the highest forms of athletic competition (i.e. the Olympics) to
those in the upper echelon of economic privilege, although there were also spectacles of
“competition” put on by gladiators who were almost exclusively slaves. There were
outlets for physical exertion; the famous Roman baths often provided a training ground
for what could be carefully labeled ancient amateur athletics. But the far more common
participation of the plebeians was the fanatical zeal for the circus games, what the satirist
Juvenal dubbed “panem et circenses” (bread and circuses).2 Yet it was the Olympians
who generated an immense sense of local pride with their accomplishments at the games.
Cities of the ancient world competed in a measurement of stature that can be at least
partly understood as a precursor to boosterism. Thus the economic stature of a city’s
1

Jason König, Athletics and Literature in the Roman Empire. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005), 37.
2
Juvenal, Satire 10.77-81

2
constituency may have had a significant impact on their ability to “rank” highly in the
order of cities under a given hegemon or empire.
In modern professional sporting culture, the process appears to be reversed. The
players engage in the sport as a profession hoping for glory, or at least a solid payday to
render them financially set for the remainder of their life. This is especially true in
professional baseball, which operates without a salary cap and allows for contracts of
above average length and astronomical dollar values. As for modern fans, the free bread
has been removed – and replaced with $6 hot dogs or, if you’re in Minnesota, $10
walleye-on-a-stick – but the zeal for the circus remains.
There are two exceptionally important and far-reaching economic developments
that have influenced the relationship between economy and place in professional
baseball. The first was the introduction of the reserve clause by Chicago White
Stockings owner and general curmudgeon William Hulbert in 1879 and its eventual
dissolution in 1975.3 The second, with which this paper is mainly concerned, is the
construction of publicly subsidized (and in some cases entirely publicly funded)
ballparks.
The massive increase in popularity of baseball at the end of the 19th century led
owners to realize that their small, mostly wooden parks were not up to the safety and

3

Tom Melville, Early Baseball and the Rise of the National League (Jefferson, North Carolina
and London: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2001.), 115, explains Hulbert’s rather tyrannical
tactics as league president. Benjamin Rader, Baseball: A History of America’s Game, 3rd ed.
(Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2008), 210-211, explains of how pitchers Dave
McNally and Andy Messersmith successfully challenged the reserve clause through arbitration in
1975.
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durability demands of the growing game.4 The invention of steel-reinforced concrete
sufficiently addressed owners’ concerns about cost, strength, and durability, and led to a
flurry of park constructions between 1900 and 1923.5 Each of these parks, though, was
privately funded. It would not be until Milwaukee broke ground for County Stadium in
1950 that pro baseball was introduced to the idea of a public subsidy for their ballparks.
In the sixty-five years since Milwaukee broke ground for County Stadium, every Major
League Baseball team except for the Red Sox and Cubs has opened at least one new park
(and Fenway has undergone some renovations and Wrigley is scheduled to). Some parks,
like Dodgers Stadium in Chavez Ravine and Oriole Park at Camden Yards, were
harbingers of change in the micro-eras of the sport.6 Others, like Coors Field in Denver
and Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum have affected not just team roster construction
but also the whole theory of player evaluation.7 In Tampa Bay, they followed
Milwaukee’s success and built Tropicana Field in an attempt to entice the White Sox to
move there in 1989 – a decision that has had serious ramifications for both the city and
the franchise.8 Yet the most common result of these new parks is the displeasure of

4

Bruce Kuklick, To Every Thing A Season: Shibe Park and Urban Philadelphia (Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1991), 18. Rader, Baseball, 94, details the “twofold increase
in attendance during the first decade of the twentieth century.”
5
Rader, Baseball, 94.
6
Neil J. Sullivan, The Dodgers Move West (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1987), 197.
7
Michael Lewis’s Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game (New York and London,
W.W. Norton & Company, 2003) does a great job of explaining the methods by which Oakland
A’s general manager Billy Beane has revolutionized the thinking about the utility of certain
baseball statistics and the need for the creation of others. What the book does not do, however, is
link any of the impetus for this change to considerable park effects that Oakland County
Coliseum has on accumulation of certain statistics like home runs or, unique to the Coliseum’s
case, popouts.
8
For the eleventh hour tactics that kept the White Sox in Chicago, see Charles Euchner, Playing
the Field: Why Sports Teams Move and Cities Fight to Keep Them (Baltimore and London: The
Johns Hopkins Press, 1993), 3-4. For a more thorough exploration of the poor ownership
decisions that eventually locked the Tampa Bay (née Devil) Rays into a lease at Tropicana field
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communities that feel they have been co-opted into financing a ballpark or arena that they
did not want. The bitter debate over construction of Milwaukee’s Miller Park famously
cost state senator George Petak his job.9 In Miami, Marlins fans who were promised a
new, community-centered Latin approach to team operations as a nod to the city’s
significant Cuban population were rewarded with an underperforming team that turned
around and traded many of its key acquisitions away after one season. People in these
locales expressed their displeasure with the possibility of funding a stadium for a multimillion dollar business that offered no explicit guarantee of return of any kind. In
essence, the people were being asked to pay more (through taxes) in order to pay again to
attend a home game or two. This process, which began in baseball, has since expanded to
all of the North American professional sports. Andrew Zimbalist has summed up this
uncomfortable situation, describing the cities as being “held hostage”:
Demand for major league teams exceeds supply. Supply is restricted by a
self-regulating monopoly. The inevitable result is that some worthy cities
do not get teams and that the fortunate cities with teams are held hostage
to threats of moving. This leads to the construction of new public
stadiums filled with luxury boxes…city guarantees on ticket sales, and
heavily subsidized rent.10
For Zimbalist, who is an economist, the root cause of all the problems faced by Major
League Baseball (MLB) is their status as a self-regulating monopoly, which they have
held since the Supreme Court ruling in 1922 of Federal Baseball Club v. National

until 2020, see Jonah Keri, The Extra 2%: How Wall Street Strategies Took a Major League
Baseball Team from Worst to First (New York: EPSN Books, 2011), 31-47.
9
Robin Toner, “Political Briefing: The States and the Issues; Wisconsin: Recall Alters Balance of
Power,” New York Times, June 9, 1996. See also Craig Gilbert, “Voters to decide Tuesday:
Stadium, spending hit in recall debate,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, May 30, 1996.
10
Andrew Zimbalist, Baseball and Billions: A Probing Look Inside the Big Business of Our
National Pastime (New York: Basic Books, 1993.), xvi.

5
League.11 It is through this special status that MLB is able to keep the number of clubs at
a level that maintains demand in excess of supply. But what of Zimbalist’s assertion that
there are “worthy” cities without teams, and that the cities that do have teams are
“fortunate?” What makes a city necessarily “worthy?” And if the inevitable result is
such that every city with a team will eventually be held hostage for a new stadium, can
they really be considered “fortunate?” One of the larger themes that this paper aims to
address is this privileged commodity status that sports team have in the economy. The
root of this privilege, Tom Melville argues, dates back to the 1880s with the
establishment of the first semi-stable closed circuit of professional baseball, the National
League. The closed circuit form provided the National League with a simultaneous
legitimacy and exclusivity; a “best of the best” status. Other clubs could form and play,
but only National League clubs could be recognized nationally. Melville argues that
from the beginning baseball placed an emphasis on “achievement,” meaning that they
had a “national focus…[whose championship structure] developed early, [making]
championship…the centerpiece of competition.”12 While this particular organization
style “encourages autonomous professionalism,” Melville argues that “no longer could
this achievement focus ever be accessed ‘from below,’ from a rising level of locallybased achievement.”13 In other words, a city could not simply declare itself part of the
National League’s championship-competitive structure; rather it would need to be
invited. When the American League, which had first organized in 1901, joined with the
National League to begin playing the World Series in 1903, the closed circuit total was

11

Harold Seymour, Baseball: Volume 2. The Golden Age (New York: Oxford University Press,
1971.), 420.
12
Melville, Early Baseball, 5.
13
Ibid., 137.
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sixteen teams playing in ten cities. Those numbers wouldn’t change until the Braves
relocated to Milwaukee in 1953, beginning the continent-wide expansion of professional
baseball that would see the game expand to thirty teams at the beginning of the 1998
season.
Expansion, of course, has increased the number of “fortunate” MLB cities who
may be held hostage from ten to twenty-seven (New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago are
the only cities that currently house multiple teams). In order to deal with this persistent
problem, Zimbalist suggests a number of alterations to the structure of the major leagues
that would effect change, some of which would be internal remedies from within the
game’s organizational structure, and some from regulatory bodies like Congress.14 On
the surface, Zimbalist’s suggestions like antitrust legislation and revenue sharing make
general sense because similar tactics were used in the first half of the 20th century to
break up major monopolies like oil and steel in an attempt to reduce the inequality gaps
in those industries and society at large. But Baseball and Billions was published just
before the infamous 1994 players’ strike, which forced MLB to recalibrate its approach to
business in an effort to heal the massive public relations damage that the strike caused.
In the wake of the strike, fans were able to voice their displeasure with their wallets by
simply not attending games. This course of action was available to them as consumers
because, unlike steel and oil, baseball was not a commodity of necessity, but rather an
outlet for consumers’ leisure-time spending. Baseball – and professional sports in
general – operate in the realm of conspicuous consumption, where, based on the nature of
the good being consumed, not all market forces act and react as would be expected in a
capitalist economy. Zimbalist has since updated his problematization of the business of
14

Zimbalist, Baseball and Billions, 177-186.
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MLB to reflect the new, post-strike organizational structure in a 2003 book May the Best
Team Win: Baseball Economics and Public Policy. The labor peace of the last two
decades has removed the need for remedies aimed at labor stabilization, but the
development of new, more intricate revenue structures like regional sports networks
(RSNs) has added a new wrinkle of complication to what Zimbalist calls “the abuses and
inefficiencies in the baseball industry.”15 While some of these particular issues will be
touched upon later in the body of this paper, the main issue that I intend to explore is the
one which most directly affects the communities that house professional teams: the issue
of publicly subsidized stadiums.
When reading both Baseball and Billions and the newer May the Best Team Win,
the logic of economic remedies taken from microeconomic theory as the best aids for
teams whose revenue streams cannot equal those of the Yankees, Angels, or Dodgers is
apparent. What is rather unsettling, however, is how similar his prescriptions read in
both books, even though they were written a decade apart. Business has grown, revenue
streams have been augmented, and yet the same problems plague both teams and cities.
In a 1997 collection, edited with fellow economist Roger G. Noll, entitled Sports, Jobs,
and Taxes: The Economic Impact of Sports Teams and Stadiums, Zimbalist undertakes
the task of trying to price out the benefit of a city paying for a stadium to keep a team.
As the collection’s Foreword indicates, “In every case, the authors find that the local
economic impact of sports teams and facilities is far smaller than proponents allege; in
some cases it is negative.” This leads the authors to conclude that “the unattractive
economics of stadiums raise a second issue: if stadiums are poor investments, why, in the
15

Andrew Zimbalist, May the Best Team Win: Baseball Economics and Public Policy
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 2.
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era of limited government and skepticism about the value of public construction projects,
are expensive stadiums still being subsidized?” Noll and Zimbalist argue that the main
forces responsible for the routinely predictable result of the stadium question are “local
politics…and the bargaining power that sports teams now enjoy because of their
scarcity.”16 Yet without exception, each time a team has sought a publicly funded
stadium they have found a provider, whether it be in their current location or elsewhere.
It is the contention of this paper that those like Zimbalist and Noll who find both
explanations and solutions in the economy leave out a critical piece of the team-city
relationship: the role of professional sports franchises in the construction and
development of community identity.

In a review of Baseball and Billions, Benjamin Rader presents an especially
canny critique of Zimbalist’s argument as a whole: “Pursuing the business of baseball
mainly from the standpoint of microeconomic theory, Zimbalist neglects cultural and
psychic considerations that frequently lead the baseball principals to ignore rational
decision making.”17 In other words, when it comes to economic decisions in pro sports,
the decision makers frequently think like fans, or at least like semi-participants, rather
than like economists. It is precisely because Zimbalist neglects the influence of these
other benefits that I argue his corrections born of microeconomic theory are incomplete at
best and may even exacerbate certain problems. While economic remedies may
transform professional sports into a more recognizably capitalist market, there is no
16

Roger G. Noll and Andrew Zimbalist, Sports, Jobs, and Taxes: The Economic Impact of Sports
Teams and Stadiums (Washington, D.C.; Brookings Institution Press, 1997), vii-viii.
17
Benjamin Rader, Review of Baseball and Billions: A Probing Look Inside the Big Business of
Our National Pastime by Andrew Zimbalist. The Journal of American History 83, no. 3 (1993):
1173.
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guarantee that the fan experience – and thus the psychological benefits – would be
preserved. In order to understand how community identity has been conceptualized,
formed, affected, and developed by local professional clubs three communities are
analyzed – Brooklyn, Milwaukee, and Washington, D.C. These communities were
chosen specifically because they all endured the loss of a professional team to relocation,
which gives each city a unique insight into the worst-case scenario of the hostage
situation. Moreover, after exploring various types of sources I concluded that people are
most cognizant about their experience after these losses, making memoirs and personal
histories a richer mine for discussion of identity.

Each community receives extensive (but not exclusive) treatment in its chapter.
The chapters are designed to explore the most stark or unique cultural and psychological
traits of each community’s experience while still keeping in consideration that
professional sports are also a business. In other words, while the community experience
carries primacy of place, economic discussion has not been abandoned entirely in favor
of a dialectical or theoretical discussion of ideas like community identity or historical
memory. For the purposes of this paper, experience is equated with reality, and ideas like
historical memory act as a piece of this reality rather than as a metahistorical guide.
Chapter 1 focuses on Brooklyn, whose shocking loss of the Dodgers after the
1957 season set the tone for every hostage stadium negotiation that has occurred since.
This chapter focuses on the formative and shaping nature, the give and take, that
American cities had with professional baseball teams in the early and mid-20th century.

10
Juxtaposed against attendance records and performance results for other cities and ball
clubs of the time, the memories of Dodger loyalists – especially Doris Kearns Goodwin –
illustrate the severe level of anguish that Brooklynites suffered and provide a blueprint of
fear for each city threatened with the relocation of their team.
Chapter 2 focuses on Milwaukee, which, after gaining the Braves in 1953 lost
them to Atlanta after the 1965 season. Milwaukee’s story focuses on the relationships
between cities in the larger context of American culture. The chapter explores a city’s
“need” to attain or retain its “Major League” status as part of a comparative self-value
judgment (i.e. boosterism) with other cities. It also compares the way that geography
influenced the community identity of Braves fans with the experience of Dodger fans.
Finally, Chapter 3 explores Washington, D.C. and its team relocation experiences.
Due to a demographic makeup that is significantly different from those in Brooklyn and
Milwaukee (and unique to the United States), Washington D.C.’s community identity
appears to be more related to – if not predictive of – the general modern fan experience.
The nation’s capital provides some interesting insights into locational loyalty, spectator
consumption patterns, and a process I have termed fan decentralization.
Professional sports cannot escape the economic influences that underlie their
existence, but neither can its markets escape the oft-irrational yet influential voice of their
consumers. The application of only micro- or macroeconomic theory is not likely to
present remedies to problematic economic decisions. Psychological and cultural benefits
are part and parcel of the professional sports cosmos, and scholars and fans alike will do
well to be mindful of this complicated and sometimes contradictory reality.
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Chapter 1
Brooklyn: “We Hardly Ever Won and It Didn’t Matter.”
When Boston Braves owner Lou Perini finally succumbed to the external
financial pressures surrounding his team and moved them to Milwaukee, he was well
aware of the local impact of his team’s relocation: “He was very apologetic. He was
sorry for the loyal Braves fans of Boston, few as they were; sorry for the business Boston
would lose; sorry for the baseball writers who would be shifted to other assignments. It
was obvious, he said, that Boston could no longer support two teams, that it was a oneteam town, and that the team in preferred undoubtedly was the Red Sox.”18 The process
of team relocation seems to follow an economic paradigm that could be attributed to any
business relocating. The essential, irreplaceable components of the business – in this case
the team ownership and front office – ultimately relocate with the business to its new
base of operation. The unskilled labor – ushers, gate workers, concession vendors, and
other employees whose duties were tied to the day-to-day operation of the parks – would
simply lose their jobs. However, it is important to remember that even this employment
is seasonal. The direct impact that a professional sports team has on the economy is still
debated (and is dealt with more in-depth in the following chapter), however this very
cursory deconstruction of it seems to suggest that relocation’s immediate economic
effects are minimal.
Milwaukee welcomed the Braves with open arms, with the local Milwaukee
Sentinel devoting its April 14,1953 edition specially to the Braves’ first home game.19 In

18

Harold Kaese, The Boston Braves 1871-1953 (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2004),
285.
19
The headline for that Tuesday’s edition read “Braves Win! Open Here Today” and featured
Red Thisend’s story of Braves pitcher Max Surkont’s 3-hit shutout the day before in Cincinnati.
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successive years Baltimore and Kansas City would do the same for the Browns (now
Orioles) and Athletics. The story that the media told echoed, in many ways, Perini’s
sentiment that “Boston could no longer support two teams.” Bill Veeck, owner of the St.
Louis Browns from 1951 until their move to Baltimore, considered St. Louis to also be a
city that was not large enough to house multiple franchises.20 The idea that a city could
be sizeable “enough” to hold more than one franchise speaks to an ability for the local
market to provide a level of revenue that could keep the team in business regardless of
performance. Author Rudy Marzano argues that this is true, blaming television for the
eventual financial pinch that drove the Browns to Baltimore. Marzano claims that St.
Louis fans “were loyal to the game, [supporting] the St. Louis Browns through year after
year of futility; St. Louis was a city of 815,000 that supported two teams for more than 50
years until television inroads drove one of them to Baltimore in 1954.”21 Marzano is
partially correct in understanding the rather obvious point that television had drastically
changed the revenue streams of professional sports. Before television drastically altered
these streams, baseball could correlate financial health and attendance figures with
confidence. However, a closer look at team performance and attendance figures in
comparison with population size lends some credence to the existence of “one-team
town(s)” that Perini talked about.
After the Athletics’ move from Philadelphia to Kansas City in 1955, only two
cities remained hosts to multiple teams: Chicago and New York. Boston, St. Louis, and
Philadelphia had all once housed two teams, but were now the homes of only one each.

20

Bill Veeck, VEECK – As in Wreck (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1962), 1.
Rudy Marzano, The Brooklyn Dodgers in the 1940s: How Robinson, MacPhail, Reiser and
Rickey Changed Baseball (Jefferson, North Carolina, and London: McFarland & Company, Inc.,
2005), 11.

21
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Table 1 presents a composite of the league achievements – or perhaps underachievements
– of the Braves, Browns, and Athletics from 1943 up through 1954 or their relocation,
whichever came first.

Boston
Braves
St. Louis
Browns
Philadelphia
Athletics
TOTAL

World
Series
Victories
0

Pennants

1

7th or 8th
Place
Finishes
1

Winning
Percentage

100-Loss
Seasons

.492

0

0

1

7

.418

3

0

0

6

.420

4

0

2

14

.441

7

Table 1: Relocated Team Achievements, 1943-1954.22 Information is a composite of each team’s
individual data, found in the Statistical Appendix, which was compiled from the information
provided at www.baseball-reference.com.

What this table illustrates rather starkly is the futility of these three franchises over the
decade leading up to their relocation. The loyalty and support that Marzano claims St.
Louis had for the Browns, for example, was likely buoyed by their lone American League
Pennant – which happened to come in 1944 during the heart of American involvement in
World War II. The reality of the St. Louis narrative appears to be that even a “city of
815,000” (which was in fact closer to 850,00023) was not large enough to produce the
necessary levels of interest, attendance, and revenue to support two professional baseball
teams, especially when one of those teams lost nearly 60 percent of its games. Perini’s
assertion that Boston was a “one-team town” parallels this idea, as Boston’s population in
the 1950s was only about 50,000 people less than that of St. Louis.
The question of whether or not there is a population threshold that will support
more than one team regardless of performance becomes even more interesting when
22

Data is collected up until 1955 or relocation, whichever happened first. Boston has data for
1943-1952, St. Louis for 1943-1953, and Philadelphia 1943-1954.
23
“Population of the 100 Largest Urban Places: 1950,” U.S. Bureau of the Census, accessed
January 16, 2014, http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027/tab18.txt.
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analyzing the case of the Athletics. Even in the first decades of the 20th Century,
Athletics manager Connie Mack purposely manipulated his roster in order to avoid
winning or losing too much, famously dismantling his AL championship teams of 19291931 through the intentional sale of his best players to other, richer owners.24 By
intentionally avoiding extended performance extremes, Mack was able to generate
business in a rather organic fashion. Doubt and curiosity about the team lured fans to
Shibe Park. From a population standpoint Philadelphia was significantly larger than both
Boston and St. Louis. The 1950 U.S. Census lists Philadelphia’s population at just over 2
million, making it roughly two and a half times as large as either Boston or St. Louis, yet
it too was unable to keep afloat two teams when one performed as poorly as the Athletics
did.
In comparison, the performance of Chicago’s Cubs and White Sox over the same
time period suggests that there is in fact a population level at which a city can support
two teams regardless of their on-field performance.

Chicago Cubs
Chicago White
Sox
TOTAL

World
Series
Victories
0
0
0

Pennants

1
0
1

7th or 8th
Place
Finishes
6
2
8

Winning
Percentage

100-Loss
Seasons

.463
.490

0
1

.477

1

Table 2: Chicago Team Achievements, 1943-1955. (Source: Statistical Appendix, www.baseball-reference.com)

As with the Braves, Browns, and Athletics, neither the Cubs nor the White Sox won a
World Series from 1943-1955, with the lone pennant for the city of Chicago coming from
the Cubs in 1945. The rate of seventh or eighth place finishes among the relocated teams
was 0.42 – for the Cubs and White Sox 0.31. The higher individual and aggregate

24

Rader, Baseball, 150.
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winning percentages of the Chicago teams, as well as the lone 100-loss season, show that
the Cubs and White Sox did essentially perform better than their relocated counterparts.
(Although the Braves individually fared better than both of the Chicago teams, their
aggregate is dragged down by the abysmal performances of the Browns and Athletics.)
But how much better, really, were the Chicago teams than the relocated group? How
significant a difference is the 0.036 points in combined win percentage? In other words,
was their performance on the field different enough to suggest that either the Cubs or the
White Sox could have been one of the relocated teams instead of the Braves, Browns, or
Athletics?
In a 156-game season, 0.036 win percentage points is worth approximately 5.5
wins. Looking at the win percentages from the best and worst teams in each season from
1943 to 1955 we find that the average difference between teams was 0.021 points, or 3.3
wins.25 Thus the average Chicago team for this period finished no more than two places
better or worse in the overall MLB standings than the average relocated team. It can then
be hypothesized that, based purely on performance, both the Cubs and White Sox should
have been at least contenders for relocation to Milwaukee or Baltimore or Kansas City.
The attendance figures, however, tell a much different story.
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Attendance
Figures of Teams

Total Attendance
(1943-1955)

Average Yearly
Attendance

Per Game
Attendance

Boston Braves
St. Louis Browns
Philadelphia
Athletics
Chicago Cubs
Chicago White
Sox

7,351,570
4,013,386
6,708,790

735,157
364,853
559,065

9,610
4,787
7,276

Average
League
Rank
6.2
7.7
6.6

12,748,209
12,245,733

980,631
941,979

12,786
12,332

3.6
4.2

Table 3: Attendance Figures for Relocated and Chicago Teams, 1943-1955. (Source: Statistical Appendix and
www.baseball-reference.com)

An initial scan of total attendance for the period reveals a myriad of interesting
facts. First, Boston actually drew more spectators – both total and per year – than either
of the other two relocated teams, yet was the first franchise to move. Moreover, Boston
was the only one of the relocated teams to finish better than fifth in league attendance
over this span, ranking fourth in 1947 and an understandable first during the pennant year
of 1948. If Braves fans turning out at just shy of 10,000 per home game from 1943-1952
was not enough to keep the team financially afloat it is probably a small miracle that the
Browns lasted in St. Louis as long as they did. And if St. Louis fans were as loyal to
their team as Rudy Marzano claims, they must have shown their loyalty in ways other
than game attendance. Even with an extra year of games, Browns fans barely eclipsed a
total attendance number that was half that of the Braves, and their average yearly and per
game attendance fell well below half of the Braves. The per-game attendance figure of
4,787 was actually 1,300 spectators less than the average attendance across all of baseball
in 1910.26 The team had regressed in popularity to levels not seen since before the World
Series was established in 1903. The Browns capped their inauspicious last decade plus of
existence by finishing last in American League attendance nine out of eleven years,
26
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including an incredible eight straight last place attendance finishes from 1946-1953.27 It
seems unlikely then that it could have been television that was responsible for the
Browns’ relocation, as Marzano argues, especially considering they were a team that
eclipsed 500,000 paid fans only three times in its final eleven years, and needed a world
war and a miracle pennant run in 1944 to achieve even that. (Even as the pennant
winners, the Browns only ranked sixth in American League attendance in 1944.)
The breakdown of attendance for Athletics games in Philadelphia is even more
lackluster, as the team, which was able to draw on a population more than two and a half
times that of Boston or St. Louis, generated attendance numbers that fell roughly halfway
between the Braves and Browns. The Athletics only drawing just over 6.5 million fans in
twelve years seems to be a significant outlier given the team’s history, the city’s
geography, and the willingness of fans to attend games expressly to see part or all of the
opposing team – an idea that is discussed further in Chapter 3. Not only is Philadelphia
itself larger, but its relatively short distance from New York, Baltimore, Washington,
D.C., and Pittsburgh opened the city up to a tourism base of about 10.3 million additional
people. This massive possible tourist base was an advantage that St. Louis certainly did
not share. Boston may have been able to draw on New York tourists to help attendance
numbers, but because those cities as well as Philadelphia housed both American and
National League teams, there was not necessarily the rivalry coupling to promote travel
and attendance that can be seen today between, for example, the Yankees and the Red
Sox, or the Giants and the Dodgers.
Finally, there is the complicating case of Chicago. As discussed above, the
Chicago teams did not necessarily perform on the field in a manner more consistent or
27
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significantly better than the three teams that relocated. In fact, the Boston Braves won
one more pennant, finished seventh or eighth in the league fewer times, won a slightly
higher percentage of their games, and avoided a 100-loss season altogether; all
achievements that surpassed the White Sox. Yet the White Sox managed to out-draw the
Braves by more than 200,000 fans per year. It should not be surprising that a city four
and a half times as large as Boston was able to draw more fans to its games. If anything,
it should be surprising that the White Sox didn’t draw an even larger number of fans. Yet
when the Cubs’ attendance records are introduced the relationship between population
size, attendance, and performance becomes more clear.
Chicago’s National League team provided its fans with a less steady ride than did
their American League counterparts. From 1943-1955 the Cubs won one pennant but no
World Series, finished seventh or eighth in the league on six occasions but never had a
100-loss season, and won just over 46 percent of their games, all while drawing 500,000
more total fans than the White Sox. Using Chicago as a composite and comparing it to
the performance and attendance of the Braves, Browns, and Athletics suggests that there
is a population “magic number” of sorts that exists somewhere between the populations
of 1950s Philadelphia (2.1 million) and 1950s Chicago (3.6 million). This “magic
number” serves to divide the country’s urban centers into (at least) two tiers. These tiers
in turn dictate the number of teams that any one city could have sustained economically,
regardless of each team’s performance. Tom Melville also believes that Chicago
presented an economically unique case. His evidence is dated much earlier, hearkening
back to baseball’s formative days: “Only Chicago, then, had the financial leverage to
bend eastern baseball to its specific needs and requirements, especially by 1875, when
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Chicago’s financial benefit to visiting clubs had become so substantial the White
Stockings claimed they were virtually subsidizing some eastern ball clubs.”28 Chicago’s
size lent it a degree of economic power that could stabilize two clubs regardless of their
ability to draw spectators with their on-field performance. Modernity seems to confirm
this idea to some degree, as the only current cities that house more than one MLB team
are the nation’s three most populous: New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago. Obviously,
a further exploration of this phenomena by an enterprising econometrist or population
theorist could help us better understand not only where the “magic number” is more
accurately – after all I have only provided a window, 1.5 million people wide at that29 –
but also it may reveal some of the more obfuscated cultural and psychological benefits
that Zimbalist neglects to discuss. For the purposes of the hostage situation surrounding
stadium financing, the idea that there exists an acceptable population to team ratio that is
sustainable regardless of team performance could be critical. Teams would be hard
pressed to convince either the local fans or the media in general that they need publicly
funded stadiums in order to simultaneously turn a profit and remain competitive. The
revenue existed in the 1950s to prevent either Chicago club from being threatened with
relocation, and this at a time when gate receipts and maybe a small portion of concession
attendance or sub-licensing were the major ways that teams filled their coffers. Teams
had yet to engage with the exceptionally lucrative alternative revenue streams that drive
contemporary team finances.
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1950. However, revenue streams have changed greatly since then, so a modern analysis would
necessarily have to weight attendance differently.
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Given this idea of the market bearing one team, regardless of performance, per a
given number of people, the case of the Brooklyn Dodgers and their relocation to Los
Angeles stands out even further as anathema in the annals of baseball history. Tables 4
and 5 illustrate the same information tracked for the relocated teams and the Chicago
clubs, but this time focusing only on New York’s three teams.
World Series
Victories
Brooklyn
Dodgers
New York
Giants
New York
Yankees
TOTAL

Pennants

1

6

1

2

8
10

7th or 8th
Place
Finishes
1

Winning
Percentage

100-Loss
Seasons

.587

0

2

.498

0

10

0

.616

0

18

3

.567

0

Table 4: New York Team Achievements, 1943-1957. (Source: Statistical Appendix and www.baseballreference.com)

Attendance
Figures of
Teams
Brooklyn
Dodgers
New York
Giants
New York
Yankees

Total
Attendance
(1943-1957)
17,980,524

Average Yearly
Attendance

Per Game
Attendance

Average League
Rank

1,198,701

15,381

2.1

14,782,613

985,508

12,821

4.1

24,555,386

1,637,026

21,241

1.2

Table 5: New York Team Attendance, 1943-1957. (Source: Statistical Appendix and www.baseballrefernce.com)

The 1950s were in many ways the third act of the Yankee dynasty. What had begun with
the Babe Ruth acquisition in 1919 and the Murderer’s Row team of 1927 now culminated
in eight World Series victories in ten appearances and a rather incredible .616 winning
percentage. Being the only American League team in New York, the Yankees set up
perfectly as the inevitable final hurdle for both the Giants and Dodgers on each team’s
quest for a World Series championship. The Giants, having been mainstays of the
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National League elite under John McGraw during the Dead Ball Era, had relinquished
some of their hold on the top of the NL, but still managed to win two pennants and a
World Series between 1943 and 1955. Yet it was Brooklyn that saw the most marked
improvement.
Brooklyn won one pennant as an independent city (in 1890 as the Bridgegrooms)
and then two more (1899 and 1900) as the Superbas just after annexation into the City of
Greater New York. While the team had fared well in the lead up to the turn of the
century, the next fifty years would not be so kind. In 1902, the final year of pre-World
Series baseball, the Superbas finished 27.5 games behind the 103-win Pittsburgh Pirates
in the NL pennant race. From 1903 until Jackie Robinson debuted with the Dodgers in
1947, Brooklyn won only three National League pennants (1916 and 1920 as the Robins,
and 1941 as the Dodgers) and no World Series. The Robins/Dodgers finished runners up
three times in the first forty years of World Series play while finishing seventh or eighth
in the division six times. The anguish of Brooklyn’s failures was only magnified by the
success of their city rivals. The numerous pennant and championship near misses led to
Dodger fans adopting the now infamous slogan “Wait Till Next Year.”
Unlike the relocated teams, all three New York teams had a history of attendance
success. The Yankees had so much success, in fact, that their aggregate alone surpassed
the combined numbers of the relocated teams. Credit for these successes can be rather
obviously assigned to New York City’s massive population. Totaling just shy of 7.9
million people in the 1950 U.S. Census, New York was able to draw its gate receipts
from a city four times as large as Philadelphia and ten times the size of Boston or St.
Louis. Comparing the successful on-field performance of all three New York teams and
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their ability to draw above average crowds with the stability of the mediocre yet wellattended Chicago teams, the data suggests that the New York franchises were insulated
from any real threat of relocation. As we know, however, this was not at all the case.
The Dodgers, having finally reached the mountaintop and won a World Series (against
the Yankees, no less) in 1955 would be gone only three years later, taking the Giants with
them to begin baseball’s westward expansion.

Despite the elusiveness of a championship, Brooklyn residents forged a bond with
the team that seemed to permeate all walks of life. Doris Kearns Goodwin recalls in her
memoir – appropriately titled Wait Till Next Year – that as she traveled the country
promoting other works all anyone wanted to talk about was baseball and the Dodgers:
The reaction was startling. Almost everywhere, as I traveled the lecture
circuit, I encountered people less anxious to hear my tales of Lyndon
Johnson, the Kennedys, or the Roosevelts than they were to share
memories of those wondrous days when baseball almost ruled the world.
The enthusiastic intensity of their recollections revealed that they were
remembering not simply the history of a team or a group of athletes but
their own history, and especially their youthful days.30
The idea that “baseball almost ruled the world” is unique but apropos of America at the
time. Goodwin’s story begins at age six, when she received a scorebook from her father
in time for the 1949 season.31 While America was concerning itself with the
promulgation of worldwide capitalism as a counter measure to postwar Soviet expansion,
it also had previously unseen levels of individual spending power, as the elevated
wartime economy had continued over into the postwar period. People could attend
baseball, that national pastime, in ever-increasing numbers, as financial prosperity
30
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became the norm. Yet Goodwin is not exactly talking about some sort of imagined procapitalist conspicuous consumption approach to understanding how baseball “almost
ruled the world.” Instead her idea, found throughout Wait Till Next Year, is that baseball
had become a truly translational community medium. Everything from casual
conversations to the deepest bonds of friendship seemed to at least originate with a
discussion of one’s favorite baseball team. Whether it was a boy at the beach, the
butchers at the Bryn Mawr Meat Market, or her best friend Elaine, Goodwin’s social
interaction revolved around which team was “yours.” 32 Growing up in Rockville Center,
a suburb of New York, Goodwin posits that the scattering of team allegiance was a result
of a sort of fan migration: “As earlier immigrants had brought their ethnic bonds with
them to America, the settlers of suburbia had, for the most part, carried their baseball
fidelity from their borough of origin.”33 Thus New Yorkers showed a willingness to
redefine whatever new community they were building in suburbia with the same division
of allegiance by which they had organized the boroughs. Tom Melville identifies New
York as the game of baseball’s foundational center, not just of form but also of cultural
importance. But as much as New York gave to baseball, Melville argues, the game gave
back. He presents a theory as to why baseball specifically became so important to the
community identity of New Yorkers:
The other influence that could have possibly moderated New York
baseballs’ accelerating achievement focus was an attachment to
geographic or institutional loyalties, in which players and supporters
recognized an obligation to place or purpose above and beyond
competitive success. This was the pattern first class English cricket
followed, with clubs developing inalienable attachments to specific
counties, and hence an institutional obligation to geographic loyalty.34
32
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Goodwin echoes this “obligation to place or purpose,” which can be more simply stated
as fandom, in part of her interview for Ken Burns’s documentary Baseball:
I think in the past that certainly Brooklyn’s character was defined by the
Brooklyn Dodgers. I mean, even just the name Dodgers coming from
these trolley cars that everybody had to dodge. The idea that Brooklyn felt
a stepchild to New York City, and that somehow the Dodgers, the Bums,
were stepchilds [sic] too, that were going to show the hoity-toity New
Yorkers that we were really better than them, defined who Brooklyn was.
And even in Long Island, where I grew up, I felt that sense of Brooklyn,
and it was all part of the Dodgers. I don’t know that that exists today in
the same way, that you define who you are through your team and through
your city. And I think it’s a loss, it means that people are more
fragmented, they’ve got themselves and a few friends, but they don’t have
that group sense, unless there’s a win, but that’s not the same, that’s not
what this was all about, we hardly ever won and it didn’t matter (emphasis
mine).
There are a number of interesting ideas in this quotation, many of which apply to more
than just Brooklyn. Some of them will be analyzed later in the paper, but for now there
are two that I believe deserve focus. The first is the opening sentence, in which Goodwin
asserts that, “Brooklyn’s character was defined by the Dodgers.” Juxtaposed against her
later statement that she “felt that sense of Brooklyn, and it was all part of the Dodgers,”
Goodwin seems to be suggesting that the development of a community identity that was
specifically Brooklyn’s could not occur without the Dodgers, nor could the community of
Dodgers fans develop their identity without a sense of Brooklyn. This development
pattern then, is the “inalienable attachment” and “institutional obligation to geographic
loyalty” that Melville describes. Because the “obligation to place or purpose” goes
“above and beyond competitive success,” professional sports can function as a unifying
power within a disparate community. If soccer historian David Goldblatt is correct, this
force is especially strong across socioeconomic or class divides. Goldblatt argues that all
around the world and throughout time, “two elements were common…[in soccer]
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cultures: the early leakage of the game from the feet of the urban elites to those of the
urban poor – and, as a consequence of this, the emergence of powerful local collective
identities around [soccer] clubs.”35 Harold Seymour finds a similar truth in baseball,
arguing that a large factor contributing to its swift early growth in popularity was the fact
that anyone could afford to play.36 Seymour’s conception of the idea of baseball’s
affordability must be qualified somewhat, though, as the early game was played often
without a glove and with few regulations on bat sizes, let alone with the time and travel
demands that even Little League all-star teams encounter today. Still, the element of
transmission is present, and when the idea of professionalism is applied it can help create
a rather crude yet solid historical explanation of this strong geographically based
community identity.
The urban elites from whom the games “leaked,” by possessing the capital to play
the game in an amateur organizational form, eventually also possessed the connections
and familiarity to capitalize on baseball as a business opportunity. (Charles Comiskey is
a good example of this process.) Meanwhile, the urban poor that received the game from
the elites would find two pathways to participation, either as professional players, or
much more likely, as fans of the local team who played the game recreationally but
cheered professionally.
Even though this transmission did in effect reinforce a stratification of society
along socioeconomic divides, it had the strange effect of simultaneously unifying, as each
participant was fulfilled in their roles. Roger Kahn has supported this idea, arguing that
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“You may glory in a team triumphant, but you fall in love with a team in defeat.”37 This
became the process whereby loyalty was cemented to a locality and community became a
manifestation of this unifying force. The mere existence of the Dodgers was enough;
their achievements on the field were an added bonus. Thus for Goodwin, the Dodgers
were Brooklyn, and Brooklyn was the Dodgers. It is unsurprising that she found when
she set down to write her memoirs that, “I could not talk about my experience as a fan
without also telling the story of my life as a young girl reaching adolescence in that
deceptively tranquil decade of the nineteen fifties.”38

“We hardly ever won and it didn’t matter.” This is probably the more fascinating
quote, as Goodwin is stating clearly that the mere existence of the Dodgers was enough;
their achievements on the field were of a secondary importance. Each layer of
Goodwin’s identity, from herself as an individual to the larger community of
Brooklynites was predicated on the existence of the Dodgers. It is understandable, then,
the venom with which many former Dodger fans recall the shocking relocation of the
team to Los Angeles following the 1957 season. Many, Goodwin included, chose
biblical analogies when forced to describe the anguish they felt when it was announced
that O’Malley would be taking the team with him:
The Dodgers officially announced their move a few days later in a terse
statement that took no account of our feelings. Even the Yankees had the
courtesy to issue a statement of regret that New York was losing the
Dodgers and the Giants. In the hearts of Brooklyn fans, O’Malley had
secured his place in a line of infamy which now crossed the centuries from
Judas Iscariot to Benedict Arnold to Walter F. O’Malley. Effigies of the
Dodger owner were burned on the streets of Brooklyn. It was all over.
Never again would the streets of New York be filled with passionate
37
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arguments about which of the city’s three teams had the best center
fielder, the best shortstop, the best catcher.39
Peter Golenbock, in Bums: An Oral History of the Brooklyn Dodgers, uses exclusively
biblical allusions for the section headings of his final chapter: “The Exodus,” “In Search
of Judas O’Malley,” “The Betrayal,” “The Last Supper,” “The Mourners,” and “The
Ashes.”40 Rudy Marzano describes himself as “a Brooklyn Dodger fanatic who to this
day has never forgiven those who moved the team to Los Angeles,” while Walter
O’Malley is “the kind of [man]…who broke the heart of his native city.”41 Damon Rice
takes a softer, if no less negative tack in his fatalistic interpretation of his time as a
Dodger fan, portraying O’Malley as somewhat a buffoon who “was out to ease the
tension of loyal Dodger fans…in a bizarre manner” when rumors of the move began. By
the time it was clear that it was going to happen, however, Rice writes that, “Walter
O’Malley wasn’t satisfied killing only one of New York’s great National League
traditions. He was out to destroy both…Never was the owner of the Dodgers more
devious, or cold-blooded, than during the summer of 1957.”42 Even Roger Kahn’s prose
paused to impart a few shots at O’Malley, complaining that he “pretends to be pure
Brooklyn Celt,” and that “as his fortune grew, pettiness invaded his style”.43 Each
memoir written about the Dodgers presents the same story of betrayal, heartache, and
loss.
Why, then, did the Dodgers relocate? Their attendance was healthy, they were
performing better on the field than they had in seventy-five years, and they had a strong
39
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tie to the community identity of Brooklyn as well as the rest of New York. In following
with the biblical allusions, many writers pinpoint O’Malley’s greed. Some argue that
while he was profitable in Brooklyn, he was not profitable enough.44 Doris Kearns
Goodwin argues that O’Malley, like Perini and Veeck and Philadelphia Athletics owner
Arnold Johnson before him, “was able to justify his move on economic grounds, [though]
the transactions signaled the ever-increasing intrusions of business considerations into the
national pastime.”45 This claim of the “ever-increasing intrusion of business” is a place
where Goodwin has allowed her memories to supersede the factual record. The way the
game of baseball naturally divides labor, and the intentional way the formation of the
National League created a distinct separation of management and production actually
mimics traditional capitalist business models. In 1965 Ralph Andreano wrote, “From a
realistic viewpoint Big League Baseball has been big business for nearly a century. A
national magazine noted, as far back as 1886, that: ‘What was formerly a pastime has
now become a business, capital is invested from business motives and the officers and
stockholders of the different (major league) clubs include men of social standing and
established business capacity.’”46 Neil Sullivan argues in The Dodgers Move West that
O’Malley’s decision was perpetuated as much by New York politicians’ willingness to let
him leave as it was by Los Angeles politicians’ desire to acquire a team. (By not labeling
O’Malley a deceiver of biblical proportions, Sullivan actually rehabilitates O’Malley’s
image – if only slightly.) Business opportunity seems the most feasible explanation for
O’Malley’s ultimate decision considering Los Angeles appeared much more willing to

44

Marzano, Brooklyn Dodgers in the 1940s, 203.
Goodwin, Wait Till Next Year, 223.
46
Ralph Andreano, No Joy in Mudville: The Dilemma of Major League Baseball (Cambridge:
Schenkman Publishing, 1965), vii.
45

29
meet his demands, but the consequences of Dodgers fans’ reactions had a similarly
important effect on the future of city-team relationships.
The story of the Dodgers’ relocation and their fans’ reactions presented each city
that housed a team with a blueprint of fear that would become omnipresent. If the Bums
could return to elite performance, engage in a hugely important social moment like the
debut of Jackie Robinson, average over one million fans per year, and still end up
relocating to the other side of the country the message seemed clear: no team was safe.
And moreover, the stability of community identity was now uncertain. What this said
about the role of sports in constructing community identity, though, was even more
intriguing. For all the important roles the Dodgers played in forming, shaping, and
representing the community of Brooklyn, for as inseparable from their own identity and
experiences as fans like Doris Kearns Goodwin found the team to be, and even for all the
history that Brooklyn and greater New York had with the game of baseball, participation
proved to be fragile. It is also possible that the community identity to which the Dodgers
contributed was ephemeral, its nostalgic place in the historical memory of Dodgers fans
projected as duplicable in other cities when in reality it was only the unique conditions in
Brooklyn that produced this relationship. After all, new sports are not being invented and
professionalized at a rapid enough pace to provide every community with the chance to
construct their identity the same way that Brooklyn and the Dodgers did. Moreover, the
context of American society that surrounded the 1950s was incomparable to another
historical situation, American or otherwise. Yet the reaction in Brooklyn is an example
of the worst-case scenario if a local team is allowed to relocate and as such hangs
implicitly over every discussion of stadium financing. Since the Dodgers left New York,
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every community faced with the option of acceding to the team’s demands or losing the
team chose the former, which almost always meant footing the bill for a new stadium.
The idea that no team and no community were protected from the forces that could result
in relocation was a significant influence on the decision making processes of other cities.
Despite the unique history of Brooklyn and the Dodgers, the paradigm of threat and loss
became entwined in all future conversations of stadium construction. The hostage
template had been created.
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Chapter 2
“The greatest thing to happen to Milwaukee since beer.”
When I explained to my grandma that I had transferred universities in order to
pursue baseball as part of my scholarly research, she decided that every time we brought
up sports or school she would tell me as many stories as she could about her trips to
Milwaukee to see the Braves. Born in Chicago in 1919, Grandma Meg moved to
northeastern Wisconsin with her family when she was only a little younger than Doris
Kearns Goodwin was when she received the scorebook from her father. Yet grandma
had no loyalties to either the White Sox or Cubs and, as far as I could tell from her
stories, never really found interest in baseball until she was an adult. The stories she told
seemed recall an enjoyable time at each game she attended, though, and they all included
two common threads: a short trip to Green Bay with church friends where they would
board a bus that provided round-trip transportation to the games for the seemingly
impossible price of $3, and Eddie Mathews playing third base and having a good game
for the Braves. In fact, if you compiled Mathews’ career from grandma’s stories, he
never had a bad game and was the best hitter in the history of baseball.47 More
interesting is the fact that it wasn’t until she lived three hours away from the closest
professional team that my grandma began to take even a passing interest in baseball.
Even though she was very young, her time in Chicago resulted in no loyalties to the local
teams, a much different experience than Goodwin’s. Likely, this was because my greatgrandfather was not much of a baseball fan himself, and thus grandma had no one to hand
down to her an interest in the national pastime as Goodwin did. At the same time,
47
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however, I would argue that as much as Doris Kearns Goodwin’s experiences illustrated
the typical experience of Dodger fans, so did Grandma Meg’s experiences illustrate how
Milwaukee and the Braves developed their own brand of community identity.
Unlike Brooklyn, Milwaukee did not have almost a century of professional
baseball to influence the way it related its community identity to the Braves. Nor had the
city been part of the epicenter of the game’s development. It did have at least some
history of baseball, though it was mostly traveling teams and minor league franchises.
Cities did develop connections with minor league teams, however as Andrew Zimbalist
and Arthur T. Johnson have noted those connections were economically fragile and even
more susceptible to the change that television would bring to the game in the 1960s than
were the connections between cities and big league clubs.48 This obviously made the
acquisition of a major league club much more attractive, as it would likely provide a
more stable experience. Expressly for the purpose of luring a major league ballclub to
the city, in 1950 Milwaukee broke ground on County Stadium. It appeared that
Milwaukee would get its first shot at the big leagues when St. Louis Browns owner Bill
Veeck, who had previously owned the minor league Milwaukee Brewers team, tried to
bring his struggling American League squad to town. The move was blocked, however,
by none other than Boston Braves owner Lou Perini, who also owned the Brewers at that
time, giving him control of the territorial rights to Milwaukee. “Faced now with the
possibility of substantial financial losses in both Boston and Milwaukee, Perini caved in.
On March 13, just ten days after rejecting Veeck’s bid, Perini called for an emergency
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meeting of baseball owners to request a move to Milwaukee.”49 The vote was
unanimously approved and the Braves moved into County Stadium for the 1953 season.
The acquisition of the Braves had two immediate and distinctive effects. First, it
legitimized Milwaukee as an urban center both in the city’s self-perception and
nationally. Milwaukee was no longer “bush league,” but rather was a “Major League”
city.

Figure 1: Front Page of the April 9, 1953 Milwaukee Sentinel
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Never were Milwaukee’s feelings of legitimacy more on display, however, than after
their stunning World Series victory in 1957:

Figure 2: Cover of a special World Series recap magazine published by the Milwaukee Journal.
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Second, it created a new type of community around which fans of the game could begin
to construct a new community identity. Like Brooklyn, the community of Braves fans
were strongly organized around physical geography. Unlike Brooklyn, though,
Milwaukee’s fan base extended well beyond a neighborhood or even the city’s urban
center. The state of Wisconsin as a whole – or at least those who were not baseball-crazy
enough to have already affiliated themselves with the White Sox or the Cubs – comprised
a new community of Milwaukee Braves fans. And their support for the team was
immediate and impressive.
World Series
Victories

Milwaukee
Braves

1

Pennants

2

Last or
SecondTo-Last
Finishes50
0

Winning
Percentage

100-Loss
Seasons
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0

Table 6: Milwaukee Braves Achievements, 1953-1965. (Source: Statistical Appendix and www.baseballreference.com)
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Figures of
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Total
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(1953-1965)
19,551,234
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1,503,941
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19,243

3.5

Table 7: Milwaukee Braves Attendance, 1953-1965. (Source: Statistical Appendix and www.baseballreference.com)

In 1953 the Braves drew over 1.8 million fans for their inaugural season in Milwaukee.
The following year they became the first non-New York team to surpass 2 million paid
attendees. In all, the Braves would finish first in National League attendance for six
consecutive years and surpass the 2 million mark four times (also consecutive). The fans
like my grandma that did get out to see the games were rewarded with a strong,
50
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competitive club that finished lower than third in the NL only once in its first decade –
finishing fourth in 1962. Moreover, in 1957, the Braves won the World Series, defeating
the powerhouse Yankees 4-3 in a seven game series. The championship year, however,
would be the apex. The Yankees would find revenge the following year in a similarly
thrilling seven game duel, the Braves would not win another pennant, and after the World
Series victory attendance dropped steadily, falling below 1 million spectators for the first
time in 1962. The attendance drop is perhaps most startling, given that in their 13
seasons in Milwaukee the Braves never finished below .500. The interest in the new
team had worn off – and television did not help matters. Especially for fans like my
grandma, the chance to still see the Braves and be saved not only the time but also the
expense of travelling was probably an attractive option. Yet the connection had been
made. Milwaukee, if ever so briefly, had become one of Zimbalist’s “worthy” cities – the
Cream City was finally “Major League.” The status would be temporary. By 1966, the
Braves had been sold to a new ownership group and relocated to Atlanta, leaving
Milwaukee once again without a big league club.

The acquisition of the Braves was critical for Milwaukee because the city had,
much like Brooklyn, been part of an intense geographic rivalry that, while not limited to
sporting contest, was more than happy to use the game of baseball as a comparative tool.
Neil Sullivan wrote that, to Brooklyn, both Manhattan and the Yankees “dominated their
respective spheres in a manner that conveyed arrogance and inevitability.”51 For
Milwaukee, Chicago had played a similar role. Able to exert enough economic influence
to allow White Sox owner William Hulbert to act as the dictator of the National League
51
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while he owned the team, and exhibiting an “almost pathological fixation upon its
perceived right” to this influence, Chicago was Manhattan’s Midwestern counterpart in
baseball and in general.52 Where Brooklyn yearned for competitive success to prove its
legitimacy, Milwaukee was simply hoping for the chance to compete.
In his book Early Baseball and the Rise of the National League, Tom Melville
argues that there are two “orientations” or sets of goals that communities can assign to
their sporting culture, which in turn becomes a cognizant act of self-definition or selfidentification. The first of these Melville dubs “expression,” or an orientation that
“generally reflects a concern with extra-competitive values and expectations, which,
historically, have ranged form a concern with moral character, social purpose, or
ideological identity, but [have been] most strongly based upon locality or community.”
The catch with expression, however, is that “this orientation is willing to compromise
competitive standards or requirements for the sake of the right to participate.” The other
is termed “achievement” and is an example of “the belief that sports organizations strictly
reflect the ‘best against the best.’” This orientation also “demand[s] competitive
resources be unconditionally utilized towards success (whatever may be the social
consequence) while also insisting there be strict limitations and qualification standards
for such competition.” 53
Expression is probably best analogized with the modern organization of Little
League, where all one must do is sign up, sell a few candy bars, and show up for the
game in order to play an inning or two in the field and get the chance to take at least one
at bat. Yet even in Little League expression doesn’t last long. The best players are
52
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merged together to form All-Star teams that spend the dog days of summer travelling the
state and the country playing against other cities’ All-Star teams for a chance to
eventually compete in the Little League World Series. Milwaukee, for some reason,
seemed to never reach past the expression orientation to achievement – at least not with
the Braves. The city welcomed the Braves with open arms and incredible enthusiasm
(see photo above on page 40). Famously, one merchant exclaimed to a Life magazine
correspondent when asked about the acquisition of the Braves that, “This is the greatest
thing to happen to Milwaukee since beer.”54 A report by the Association of Commerce
claimed that the acquisition of the Braves had “pumped between $5 million and $8
million into the local economy in increased taxi, restaurant, hotel, and retail revenues.”55
As mentioned above, intrigued fans came out in unprecedented numbers to fill County
Stadium’s 33,000 seats. Harold Kaese and R.G. Lynch explain that, “The fans came in
buses…so many buses that they created problems. The bus park for forty vehicles
overflowed and was increased to accommodate eighty, overflowed again and once more
was enlarged. The peak came at a Chicago Cubs night game in July, when one hundred
and fifty buses created the granddaddy of all traffic jams.”56 Undoubtedly, my grandma
was on one of those buses – although I never got the chance to ask her about the overflow
in the parking lot.
The buses weren’t the only part of her Braves trips that represented a new
community built around Milwaukee’s new team. It has been estimated that about
250,000 of the admissions that the Cubs and White Sox drew each year came from
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Wisconsin residents, meaning that just over 1,600 fans on average at any given Chicago
game were Wisconsinites. Many of them, however, were repeat attendees and most were
drawn from southeastern Wisconsin.57 While the arrival of the Braves likely drew a
number of these fans back from their Chicago voyages, it is interesting to note that the
Cubs took the brunt of the attendance hit, dropping from second in the National League
in attendance in 1952 to sixth in 1953 as total admissions for the team were reduced by
just over 260,000. Comparably, the White Sox lost only about 40,000 paid admissions
while actually moving up a spot in AL rankings from third to second.58 The reason for
this uneven decline is somewhat obvious, as the Cubs now had an NL rival only a little
more than an hour away. There is no follow up research or comment that posits whether
the White Sox still drew those same fans, even though their games would be the only
chance for Wisconsinites to see some of the AL’s great players like Yogi Berra, Bob
Lemon, or Larry Doby. Meanwhile, people from all over the state flocked to see and to
celebrate the Braves, with many of Milwaukee’s smaller suburbs like Cedarburg and
West Bend hosting their own “days” or “nights” at the park. In more distant places the
arrival of the Braves had an impact on the economy that, however temporary, was
noteworthy, such as in Sauk City where the first passenger train in 20 years was run
special into Milwaukee for a game. The Braves name was also adopted and co-opted by
every organization imaginable, appearing in everything from the name of a high school
athletic conference to the special on the menu at an Algoma hamburger stand.59 The
Braves did not just represent Milwaukee, but were an emblem of a larger sense of state
pride and association, if only for a short time.
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The gusto with which Milwaukee residents not only attended games but also
celebrated the Braves’ arrival outside the nine innings a day at County Stadium
exemplifies Daniel Nathan’s assertion that “sports have what seems to be or feels like a
unique ability to enable disparate people to experience something approximating
communitas…an intense community spirit, a feeling of solidarity and togetherness.”
Implicit in this idea of communitas (and discussed more in the following chapter) is the
notion that, in its unifying force, communitas can overcome – and thus does not
necessarily represent – geographical boundaries, tensions, or differences. Because the
overarching link was celebration of the Braves, the entire state could unite in the cause of
baseball. It may have been a five-hour plus trip for Eau Claire residents, for example, but
the Braves were still a “local” team. Nathan further argues “that rooting for local athletes
and home teams often symbolizes a community’s preferred understanding of itself, and
that doing so is an expression of connectedness. It’s an expression of public pride and
pleasure, a source of group and personal identity.”60
For Milwaukee, this simultaneous expression of group and personal identity was a
perfect medium through which to translate its diverse and not quite unified culture. For
most of its existence, the city lacked a singular identity to overwrite its cultural pluralism.
Like New York, Milwaukee was a grouping of ethnic enclaves whose geographic
separation resulted in inter-neighborhood tension similar to that between boroughs. Yet
where the Dodgers stood as Brooklyn’s symbol on the ball field, battling against its
neighbors in the Bronx (Yankees) and Manhattan (Giants), Milwaukee’s single team
allowed the city to create a more unified identity from the disparate people that Nathan
60

Daniel Nathan, ed., Rooting for the Home Team: Sport, Community, and Identity (Urbana,
Chicago, and Springfield: University of Illinois Press, 2013), 3.

41
refers to. Likely nothing more than happy coincidence, various groups of Milwaukeeans
were able to single out players on the Braves’ team who shared their ethnic or religious
heritage and celebrate them:
Jews put on a “night” for Sid Gordon, and Germans for Warren Spahn;
Italians gave one for Sibby Sisty; Negroes for [Billy] Bruton, Jim
Pendleton and George Crowe…Lutherans turned out 10,000 strong to see
Andy Pafko receive a Chevrolet sedan and other gifts which they had
contributed. Poles gave a birthday part at home plate for Max Surkont and
35,000 fans sang “Happy Birthday” for the new Duke of Mitchell Street.61
Shared heritage was not necessary to receive a shower of gifts from the fans, however, as
Eddie Mathews was presented with a new watch just for playing well (he led the league
in home runs that year), the Ozaukee Country Club hosted a dinner-dance for players, and
during one celebration of Max Surkont – perhaps even his birthday party at home plate –
fans gifted his son with a brand new tricycle.62 Where Doris Kearns Goodwin argued
that the Dodgers and Brooklyn supplied mutual influence in the creation of their
community identity, the Braves served as an outlet to unite and celebrate the community
identity of not only Milwaukee, but also on a larger scale the state of Wisconsin. Even
though Goodwin had argued that the Dodgers “hardly ever won and it didn’t matter,” the
reality was that Brooklynites and Dodger fans still defined themselves on a basis of
achievement, not expression. The mantra “Wait Till Next Year” was a manifestation of
Brooklyn’s unrealized championship dreams. In contrast, Milwaukee never had the time
to develop an identity based around achievement, focusing instead on expression. Partly,
this was because the team arrived in 1953, won a World Series in 1957, and was
relocated to Atlanta after the 1965 season; there was no championship drought or history
of seasons of near misses. Also factoring into this was the peculiarity that attendance at
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Braves games had begun a precipitous drop after the 1959 season, even though the team
remained competitive and never posted a losing record either at home or for an entire
season.
The Braves only played thirteen seasons in Milwaukee, their departure almost as
sudden as their arrival. According to Glen Gendzel, the Braves were lured to Atlanta
because by the mid 1960s American urban centers had become entangled in what he calls
the “sport of competitive boosterism” (original emphasis).63 Gendzel is here referencing
the idea about professional sports that over time they have become “more” business, and
“less” sport, echoing Goodwin’s idea that business began an “intrusion” into the national
pastime.64 Again, this is a distortion of reality as professional sports have, since they
became professional, been simultaneously business and sport. If a person identifies
themselves as both Jewish and Democrat, but as they age begins to forego synagogue on
Saturdays to participate in campaign work for a local Democratic elected official, it does
not actually make that person any “less Jewish” or “more Democratic.” Instead, they
have simply reorganized the priority and outward expression of their personal identity to
reflect a hierarchy of values that has changed. While this may seem like so much
semantics, the distinction is crucial when applied historically because the idea that
something or someone can become “more” of one part of their identity while becoming
“less” of another part introduces an immediate bias of influence. Rather, a person or
institution or community’s identity makeup is simultaneous; the example above is always
both Jewish and Democratic in the same way that professional sports are always both
sport and business. Moreover, the history of team relocation supports this interpretation,
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albeit in a rather paradoxical manner. If, in fact, business had become the preeminent
driving force of professional sports, pushing out psychological and unquantifiable
benefits, then it could have been expected that cities across the board would have balked
at the idea of paying to construct teams’ stadiums for them while handing over most of
the supplemental revenue streams generated by the parks as well. Such an arrangement –
which is of course the exact one that most teams and cities enter into today – would have
been good business for the teams but a remarkably poor investment for the cities.
Instead, cities routinely cave in to the strong-arming of the teams, building newer and
more modern stadiums for franchises that have steadily increased in value over the last
sixty-five years.65 The competitive boosterism that Gendzel cites is then analogous to
Melville’s achievement orientation, but instead of being localized and dealing with a
team’s on-field performance it deals with the national success of cities in acquiring and
retaining teams.

The departure of the Braves after the 1965 season was made even more untenable
by the circumstances surrounding the team’s ownership. Perini had managed to be
profitable every season until 1962, but after posting his first season of financial losses he
sold the team to a group of investors that would become known as the “Rover Boys.”
Not only did these investors hail from Chicago, the city with whom Milwaukee had been
overjoyed to compete against, but they wasted no time in making overtures to Atlanta in
hopes of relocating the team there. Gendzel speculates that, “what must have prodded the
Rover Boys to seek greener pastures was the $3 million short-term loan they obtained to
buy the Braves in 1962. Interest expense was considerable, with a $2 million balloon
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payment due in 1968. Rather than spend more money to revive attendance, the Rover
Boys sought a quick fix.”66 In the ensuing court battle to keep the Braves in Milwaukee,
the irony appears to have been lost on the city that the methods through which they
acquired their team and the massive early successes of that team would provide the
blueprint for other cities to make relocation a very attractive option for franchises. In
1966 Atlanta completed its play for the Braves. After thirteen years of ebullience,
Milwaukee was “Major League” no more.

In 1957 the Dodgers and Walter O’Malley had unwittingly provided the
professional sports world with a new approach to economic security. Unlike the Braves,
Browns, and Athletics, the Dodgers were not financially destitute, nor were they like the
Browns or A’s in their possession a long-term abysmal performance record. Instead,
O’Malley was attempting to head off any chance of either of these things happening. He
understood that the increase in popularity of the automobile and the increasing
suburbanization of the country meant that the parks, built in the flurry of construction in
the 1910s and 1920s which were centrally located to provided access for mass transit and
pedestrians, would no longer effectively serve the needs of the new metropolises. This
understanding also implied a shift in revenue streams, the tectonic plates of the
professional sports world. Through the 1950s and into the 1960s, gate receipts were still
the largest revenue producers, but as will be discussed in the following chapter, this
would not hold for long. Neil Sullivan argues in The Dodgers Move West that
O’Malley’s decision to relocate the Dodgers was actually more of a gamble than one
might think. This directly contradicts the Braves’ experience, obviously, although when
66

Gendzel, “Competitive Boosterism,” 541.

45
discussing the move of the Dodgers (and Giants) one must include the increased travel
requirements. Yet still, Lou Perini was able to move a team that Boston had essentially
given up on into a city waiting with open arms, generate profit almost entirely on fan
interest alone for the first decade, sell the team for a then-record high price, and do it all
without the complications of financing a stadium.67
This small sample of exceptional success created confirmation bias towards the
financial possibilities for owners who sought to relocate their teams. As Jules Tygiel
notes, Baltimore received the Orioles in 1954 with spirits equally as high as those with
which Milwaukee had received the Braves. The Orioles’ new park, Memorial Stadium,
had cost only $2.5 million to construct, but in the long run that was likely a fortunate
price. Unlike the Braves, the Orioles on-field performance remained woeful (perhaps the
only throwback to their Browns days). The team finished 57 games out of first place in
their first year in Baltimore, and where Milwaukee attendance had actually increased
mid-summer as fans realized they had a contender in their midst, the crowds at Memorial
Stadium dropped off sharply after having caused the “most glorious traffic jam” in the
city’s history.68
Yet relocation, even in the face of possibly abysmal performance, proved the most
prudent approach to the woes of clubs that shared a city. In fact, relocation became such
an attractive option that Major League Baseball began to alter some of its policies to
allow owners a bit more freedom of movement. In 1953, MLB voted to relax the
requirement of a unanimous vote in order to relocate, moving the vote down to a three-
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fourths assent by the league containing the moving team and no vote in the other league.
Thus the required number of assenting votes was reduced from sixteen to six.69
Furthermore, the commissioner’s office outlined a set of guidelines whereby a team could
“qualify” for relocation: “The franchise has to have a history of substantial losses over a
long period. The stadium has to be substandard, with no prospects of refurbishment. The
city has to have taken some steps to indicate it is not interested in baseball and is no
longer going to be supportive. And there has to be some sense that staying with the
community and trying to rebuild the franchise would be ultimately futile.”70 Obviously,
these criteria remain open to wide interpretation. The designation of “losses” must mean
financial losses; otherwise teams like the Pirates and Royals would have been relocated
years ago for their inability to crest a .500 winning percentage with any regularity. The
requirement that the stadium be “substandard, with no prospects of refurbishment” is
perhaps the grayest of these interpretive areas, as there is no body or commission,
independent or otherwise, that sets a standard for the stadiums to be below. The standard
is probably best described as the answer to the question “Do most teams have a stadium
that is nicer or newer than ours?” Contemporary concern focuses on the number of
luxury box suites a stadium can sell as a major signifier – at least to franchise owners – of
how high quality a stadium is, and baseball also concerns itself with the number of “club
seats” each stadium can offer. Club seats often come with amenities like oversized
padded chairs, are almost always located directly behind home plate and in the
surrounding foul territory, and have even begun to include access to things like free
unlimited beverages and access to unlimited, sometimes five-star, catering. In a famous
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example of what could be called over-accommodation, new Yankee Stadium offered all
of these amenities and more to those who purchased tickets for the seats right behind
home plate, resulting in fans who simply stayed in the club room inside the stadium while
the game was being played, watching on the big screen while enjoying the unlimited food
and drink.71 This resulted in viewers accusing the Yankees of being unable to sell out
their brand new stadium, as game feeds frequently made the seats directly behind home
plate appear empty. A cynic might then interpret the “substandard” aspect of the
relocation condition to mean “lacking enough amenities to effectively distract fans from
desiring to watch the game from their actual paid admission seat.” And such a cynic
might not be especially wrong.
Furthermore, the final two qualifications provided by the commissioner’s office
could be interpreted as MLB actually laying the groundwork for teams to hold their host
cities hostage for new stadiums. In stating for one of the requirements that a city “has to
have taken some steps to indicate it is not interested in baseball and is no longer going to
be supportive” the commissioner effectively isolated a city’s stance to all but one
quadrant of the Punnett Square of possibilities if it wished to prevent relocation.
Showing both interest and support would seem to garner a full cooperative effort by MLB
and the franchise to make sure the team remains in its current city. The idea that a
community would show no support or interest seems counterintuitive given the vicious
debates around acquiring and keeping teams, but if it did occur it seems only natural to
let a team leave in that situation. I am unsure of when a city would ever be supportive (as
in financially) yet have no interest in keeping a team, but what about a city that
71
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desperately wishes to keep its team, but finds the financial demands for stadium
construction untenable? This is, in essence, the hostage situation that Zimbalist writes
about, and which MLB seems to have little interest in interrupting.
Even if baseball provided a type of tacit support for its franchises holding cities
hostage to get new stadiums, the cities did not just roll over and pay to keep teams once
the first three had relocated and a more sustainable market saturation level was
achieved.72 When the discussion of a new park for the Phillies began in the late 1950s,
the city of Philadelphia had a unique response. “As late as 1959 Jim Tate, then city
council president, announced that although he ‘desperately’ wanted the Phillies to stay in
Philadelphia, he could not recommend public financing of a ball park.”73 Even before
councilman Tate’s comments, Philadelphia Mayor Joseph Clark, Jr. had commented on
the idea of the city funding a new stadium, saying that, “he personally rooted for the
Phillies and that he was ‘no socialist’ – government would not subsidize sports.”74 Too
often, historians of baseball engage the game on its mythmaking level, delving into the
“real” world only when unsavory economic intrusions interrupt the national pastime. The
reality of baseball’s history is that the sport has thrived in spite of its national home being
“at war” in some form or another for most of its existence. While the Cold War did not
disrupt play nearly as much as either of the World Wars, it is entirely possible that it had
unseen effects off the field that influenced the outcomes of local debates, as appears was
the case in Philadelphia. Milwaukee, a known left-leaning city with a history of socialist
mayors, may have been the perfect incubator for public funding for stadiums, even if the
long-term result turned out to be a capitalist approach of investment, asset appreciation,
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and sale for profit. The influence of Cold War ideology on the game, and on American
professional sports in general, has not, to my knowledge, been studied in any full-length
approach. The likely reason for this, however, is a lack of explicit evidence like the
quote from Mayor Clark that engages directly with the anti-communist sentiment during
the Cold War. At minimum, historians should work to be more attentive to
contextualizing professional sports in reality and not allowing them to exist only in
worlds of escapism and nostalgia. Ideally, policymakers will wise up and do the same.

Milwaukee’s contribution to the hostage paradigm was not as direct as
Brooklyn’s. Partly this was because Milwaukee was never really given the chance to
keep the Braves from moving. William Bartholomay, head of the infamous Rover Boys,
had insisted to the Milwaukee press that his group had no intentions of relocating the
Braves while simultaneously traveling to Atlanta to cement a deal with the city’s mayor,
Ivan Allen. When Bartholomay’s duplicity was revealed, both the city and the state took
the Braves and baseball to court - there had been no threats of moving unless a new park
was built, there had been no hostage situation. Ironically, it was a set of policy changes
that the commissioner may have considered above standard that began Milwaukee’s
undoing: “The team converted general admission seats into higher-priced reserve seats
and, perhaps more offensive to Milwaukeeans, barred fans from bringing their own beer
into the ballpark.”75 Jules Tygiel posits that these policy changes were the result of the
Braves continually declining attendance, and while it is certainly credible that increased
prices for both tickets and concessions would have some impact on attendance, it is too
much to argue that these changes could result in attendance figures halving between 1960
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and 1962. Whatever the reason, though, the decline was what eventually led Perini to sell
the team to the Rover Boys who moved them to Atlanta.
The construction of County Stadium, and its effectiveness in securing the
acquisition of a major league team, is perhaps the most important and direct economic
legacy of Milwaukee in professional sports. Cities all over the nation initiated plans to
construct a stadium with public funds in order to lure other teams. In Baltimore, Kansas
City, Atlanta, Minneapolis/St. Paul, and Oakland, the stadiums were built and, as in
Milwaukee, teams appeared via relocation. The ease with which these cities acquired
teams combined with the profitability of relocation for ownership groups to create an
unstable geography of professional baseball. By selling the Braves at the first sign of
trouble, Perini had inadvertently provided a blueprint for investors to make exorbitant
sums of money in a moderate period of time with more control than the stock market
offered. The process was simple: buy a team, relocate that team to a city either already
equipped with a park or exceptionally willing to provide one, ride the team’s instant
popularity to yearly profit, and then sell the team for more than it was bought for before
the profits dry up.
Brooklyn had shown to league owners that cities were vulnerable to the threat of
relocation regardless of a team’s finances or on field performance. By never receiving
that threat, Milwaukee was forced to fight in the courts to keep its team. The result there
illustrated that baseball’s antitrust exemption was more powerful than state litigation.
When considered in combination, it is easy to see how teams were able to leverage cities
into the hostage situations. Should a city choose to call its team’s bluff, there were plenty
of waiting suitors happy to provide a brand new stadium in which to play. Should the
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city attempt legal recourse to prevent relocation, baseball still held the antitrust
exemption trump card. Caught between two unsavory choices, cities in the last quarter of
the 20th century began to concede to teams’ demands, passing bills, sometimes over loud
local protest, that would fund the new stadium and keep the city’s “Major League” status.
Ironically, Milwaukee found itself in just such a fight in the early 1990s when the
Brewers began to pursue a new home. The Miller Park debates were contentious, yet it
appeared as though Milwaukee was on the verge of undoing the precedent they had set
four decades earlier by declining a five-county tax that would help raise $290 million in
subsidy money for the construction of a new stadium. At the eleventh hour though the
tax won out, although it cost State Senator George Petak, the man who cast the deciding
vote, his seat in a 1996 recall election. Unlike the 1960s, Milwaukee was able to keep its
team.
In addition to inadvertently institutionalizing teams’ leverage in the relocation
process, Milwaukee also saw its claim of an economic boon directly related to team
acquisition repeated everywhere that a team relocated to. Baltimore, Kansas City, Los
Angeles, and San Francisco all made similar claims to such an extent that in a 1958
edition of U.S. News and World Report the phrase “A big league team is a financial asset
to a city” was treated as dogma.76 Milwaukee Mayor Henry Maier repeated the sentiment
after the city took the Braves to court, arguing that the loss of the team would be a loss of
$3.5 million in added revenue for the city.77 This revenue is, however, in many ways a
fallacy. As Roger Noll and Andrew Zimbalist have concluded, much of the revenue
thought to be produced by stadiums is actually just a shift in local spending patterns.
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Consumers are spending their money at the park rather than inside local businesses,
giving the illusion of increased spending. Tracing the path of money spent by a single
consumer is difficult, but the overall conclusion can be made that most of the money
flows upwards into the hierarchy of the sport, rather than back into the community.
Often, once the stadium is built, it is handed over to team ownership in a deal that usually
specifies a lease payment (which is often very generous) and a modest taxation on
stadium operations. The impact of the latter is routinely overstated, Noll and Zimbalist
conclude, because “all of the gross tax collections within a stadium cannot properly be
attributed to it because some of that tax revenue would have been collected elsewhere [in
the municipality] had the stadium not been built or used.”78 As much psychological and
social positive as the Braves provided for Milwaukee, the celebratory nature of the “new”
team saw many of its more unsavory realities replicated nationwide without critical
consideration. Cities wanted so desperately to have the chance to participate that they
forfeited sound financial decision-making.

Although the Braves were the first of many franchises to be showered with
affection by their new cities, Tygiel points out that, “Ironically, many remember the era
as one of abandonment, rather than delivery.”79 Dodger fans characterize the loss of their
team as a sinister act of betrayal because at least three generations of Brooklynites had
grown up with the Dodgers as a local fixture. Milwaukee Braves fans, on the other hand,
were not provided with enough time to incorporate the ritual and pageantry of baseball in
the same way they might incorporate the ritual and pageantry of religion into their daily
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lives. The relocation of the Braves in 1965 was absolutely an act of betrayal, one that is
arguably more sinister than O’Malley’s, regardless of what Dodger fans think, feel, and
remember. Yet Milwaukee as a community, solidified for the first time in celebration
around their new team, remembered the relocation as more a sorrowful or melancholic
event than a betrayal. This, I believe, is because while Brooklynites’ identity relationship
with the Dodgers was more developmental and inherent, Milwaukeeans kept the Braves
at arms’ length when it came to identity, incorporating them in a more social and
participatory setting than the deep individual relationships that Dodger fans exhibited.
My grandma’s stories were part of a social memory, a type of community identification
that spans time and place, incorporates historical memory, but also has a strong
voluntary-participatory element. Geoffrey Cubitt further explains that, “The processes of
social memory are ones which are always cross-weaving the social and the individual,
producing pools of retrospective knowledge and understanding that are available both for
social and for personal appropriation.”80 When Grandma Meg actually rode the buses
from Green Bay to Milwaukee to watch the Braves, she was a part of the rather literal
social community of “Braves fans” (or at least “Braves spectators”). Fifty years later, as
she told me stories of her trips to Milwaukee, she was tapping into those pools of
retrospective knowledge as a way of explaining who she was, perhaps without even being
cognizant of what she was doing. If the social memory of Brooklyn Dodger fans is a
story of an identity lost, then the social memory of Milwaukee Braves fans is one of
identity found – even if only for a brief portion of their history.
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Chapter 3
Washington, D.C.: “The worst time of the year is baseball season.”
On April 17, 1953, probably the most famous event in the history of Washington,
D.C.’s Griffith Stadium occurred. Mickey Mantle, superstar centerfielder for the visiting
New York Yankees hit a home run that saw the ball leave his bat and travel directly into
legend. Tom Deveaux writes “Mantle smashed what was possibly the longest home run
ever…in the fifth inning off…new lefty Chuck Stobbs…The ball flew over the 50-foot
fence at the 391-foot mark in left centerfield, and was deposited in the backyard of the
house at 434 Oakdale Street.”81 A local boy named Donald Dunaway then recovered the
ball, and the home run became so legendary that it was the subject of an entire chapter of
Jane Leavy’s history/biography of Mantle titled The Last Boy. It is also rather fitting that
the most celebrated moment in Griffith Stadium’s history – and thus, in many ways, in
the history of the Washington Senators, one of the American League’s original eight
teams – was a mythic achievement performed by the opposing team. In much the same
way that the Dodgers and Braves contributed to their home city’s community identity, the
relationship between the Senators and Washington, D.C. was based largely on the idea
that the team represented (or manifested) demographic peculiarities. Yet both the
Dodgers, in their ability to symbolize the inferiority complex and struggle of Brooklyn,
and the Braves, who were used to unite a partitioned Milwaukee yearning for legitimacy,
represented communities whose identity was formed in part by other communities
nearby. The Senators, however, had no similar history of geographic competition from
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which to draw. Instead, their engagement with D.C.’s community identity was more
insular.
Nestled in a southerly bend of the Potomac River, Washington, D.C. is not a large
enough city to support a borough-style geographic layout like New York, thus it could
not organically develop the neighborhood tensions writ large that manifested themselves
in the on-field play of the New York teams. Also, while Baltimore is in closer proximity
to Washington, D.C. than Chicago is to Milwaukee, similar inter-city competition was
also lacking due in large part to the nation’s capital having more salient concerns than
competitive boosterism with a nearby metropolis. Deveaux puts it best, explaining that,
“because of the large public-service base in Washington, many…fans were from other
parts of America and had no emotional investment in the Senators. When they did show
up, they were just as apt to root for the visiting team.”82 The Senators’ performance and
attendance record support this, illustrating a team in a city that was relatively unmoved
by both success and failure.
World Series
Victories

Washington
Senators (19431960)
Washington
Senators (19621971)
TOTAL

Pennants

0

0

0

0

0

0

Last or
SecondTo-Last
Finishes
10

Winning
Percentage

100-Loss
Seasons

.429

2

7

.417

4

17

.424

6

Table 8: Washington Senators Achievements, 1943-1971. (Source: Statistical Appendix and www.baseballreference.com)
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Washington
Senators (19431960)
Washington
Senators (19621971)

Total
Attendance
11, 538, 047
7, 314, 695

Average Yearly
Attendance
641, 003
664, 972

Per Game
Attendance
8, 349
8, 284

Average League
Rank
6.4
9.183

Table 9: Washington Senators Attendance, 1943-1971. (Source: Statistical Appendix and www.baseballreference.com)

The Senators’ on-field performance rivaled that of the Browns and Athletics for futility.
The team’s last successful pennant campaign had come in 1933 and its last (and only)
World Series victory was 1924. The Senators’ seventeen last or second to last place
finishes over a twenty-nine year span give a rate of 0.59, almost double that of the
Chicago teams.84 This futility is even more remarkable when one considers that there
were actually two Washington Senators franchises. (The impact of this dual identity on
the city’s relationship with the team is discussed further below.) The expansion Senators
managed to accrue their four 100-loss seasons in consecutive years (1961-1964), a feat
matched only by the expansion Mets (1962-1965) – both teams compiling these
lamentable records in their first four years of existence.
Attendance at Senators games was not much better, as the “original” Senators
drew better per-game averages than only the Browns, Phillies, and, by the narrowest of
margins, their expansion counterparts. Both incarnations of the Senators combined for
only eight years of .500 or better baseball out of twenty-nine, and the effect of the pull of
other teams is distinctly visible in two specific places. First, in 1954, the year the Browns
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moved to Baltimore as the Orioles, attendance at Griffith Stadium dropped by over 92,00
total fans even though the Senators were only two games worse at home than they had
been in 1953. This lends credence to Jules Tygiel’s argument that the Orioles threatened
the Senators.85 Inexplicably, team owner Clark Griffith “favored the move, feeling it was
vital to that club’s [the Browns/Orioles’] survival.”86 As a result, his own club came
under a more serious threat of failure and collapse with the immediate attendance hit they
took.87 Second, the effect of expansion teams on perennially poor draws like the Senators
is evident in the attendance records of the 1969 and 1970 seasons. Both of these seasons
the “new” Senators drew over 800,000 fans, outperforming their average draw by over 20
percent each year as fans came to see the American League’s new teams, the Milwaukee
Brewers (née Seattle Pilots) and Toronto Blue Jays. As an expansion franchise
themselves in 1961 the new Senators drew just shy of 600,000 people, well below their
eventual average, indicating that local residents were, in fact, “just as apt to root for the
visiting team.” Yet much like in Milwaukee, the newness of even these other teams wore
off and after the 1971 season owner Bob Short moved the team to Texas where they
became the Rangers.

Baseball, it seemed, was for Washington, D.C. more about status than about
achievement. There might not be any statement about the dismal performance of the
Senators that could be considered hyperbole. And yet quips about their futility seem to
have been part of the surrounding community. These one-liners, however, were not as
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tongue in cheek about the team as Dodgers fans were with the infamous “Wait till next
year” when talking about their “Bums,” although some quips were humorous. Author
John Steinbeck joked that, “There is a federal law that forbids them to win.” Sportswriter
Roger Kahn wrote that, “For the Washington Senators, the worst time of the year is
baseball season.” Even President Lyndon B. Johnson would get in on the fun, professing,
“We cheer for the Senators, we pray for the Senators, and we hope that the Supreme
Court doesn’t declare them unconstitutional.”88 Others were more direct about the team’s
moribund state. In her novel Squeeze Play, Jane Leavy has fictional sportswriter A.B.
Berkowitz explain, “Watching the Washington Senators, you forget the beauty of
baseball. You forget the bare-handed grab, the elegant stretch at first, the choreography
of a six-four-three double play. Watching the Washington Senators is like watching the
human condition without the slapstick. It is an exercise in humility.”89 Bert Sugar wrote
of the team, “The Senators might have been one of baseball’s most god awful teams, a
thread-bare and lackluster group of has-beens, never-wases, and names that were not
even household names in their own households.”90 Part of the reason the team was
comprised of such men was because of the shoestring budget on which the organization
ran. The Griffiths – first Clark and then later his nephew-cum-son Calvin – frequently
bought players who were past their prime and cheap, while selling any prospective
marquee players well before their value peaked in an attempt to keep payroll down even
before free agency caused player values to skyrocket.
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Part of the reason for this revolving door approach to the team’s roster was the
fact that, “While this was still an era when major-league teams had farm clubs scattered
all over the country, Washington had only three.”91 When a rare quality farmhand did
appear, like Harmon Killebrew, he was not around long. (At least in Killebrew’s case,
though, this was because the entire franchise relocated after his first two full seasons in
the majors.) This roster turnover didn’t just result in poor on-field performance, it was
also a reason why Washington never formed the community bonds with teams like those
that have been discussed in Brooklyn and Milwaukee. Doris Kearns Goodwin explained
the importance of consistency on linking teams with their fans thusly: “In those days
before players were free agents, the starting lineups remained basically intact for years.
Fans gave their loyalty to a team, knowing the players they loved would hold the same
positions and, year after year, exhibit the same endearing quirks and irritating habits.”92
Goodwin, Rudy Marzano, even my grandma, focused their memories – and thus their
identities – around certain players on the teams they followed, a luxury never really
provided to Senators fans after Walter Johnson retired. This failure of consistency was
only exacerbated when after the 1960 season the original Senators (the Griffith’s team)
moved the squad to Minneapolis/St. Paul where they became the Twins. Bob Short, the
man who eventually won the expansion team rights for the “new” Senators, actually had
a history with the process of professional franchise relocation. His first foray into team
ownership had been with the cellar dwelling, hometown Minneapolis Lakers of the
National Basketball Association in 1957 – who he promptly moved to Los Angeles in
1960 and sold for a profit. While there is no link evident in either primary or secondary
91
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sources, it would seem that the maneuverings of the Rover Boys in Milwaukee were
similar to that of Short’s profitable relocation of the Lakers. Short’s particular history
with relocation combined with the fact that the practice seemed to be spreading was cause
enough for the immediate concern that the expansion Senators might not be long for
Washington either: “Within two days of…Bob Short’s purchase of the Washington
Senators, a small caption appeared in the Washington Star to the effect that he was not
making any promises about keeping his baseball team in Washington. (original
emphasis)”93 Short’s squad, inexplicably also called the Washington Senators, would
perform much like their predecessors, providing fans with a continuity only of failure. It
further cemented the club’s relationship with the city to a point where significant
attendance increases would come only when there were interesting new teams to come
see.

The lack of a full-size farm system, the fluid roster construction, the lackluster
attendance, problematic ownership, and the poor performance of the team itself were all
contributing factors in the Senators constructing a relationship with Washington, D.C.,
that would allow a mammoth home run by an opposing player to become one of the home
stadium’s most memorable occurrences. Washington’s peculiar demographics also
served to solidify social divides that prevented the city from uniting around the team the
way Brooklyn and Milwaukee had done. The large public service contingent in
Washington had two major effects on the way the team and the city constructed their
community identity. Since the majority of politicians could not, by design, hail from
Washington itself, it was entirely possible that they arrived in the nation’s capital with
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franchise allegiances in tow. Moreover, politicians tend to be more affluent members of
society, so it was probable that, at least before the massive introduction of club seats and
luxury boxes, attending a baseball game did not provide the “ostentatious display of
wealth” that would have been necessary to achieve leisure class membership.94 Of course
this did not prevent those in the service sector from enjoying a ballgame with their family
in the same way that local white- and blue-collar laborers did. What this affluent status
did do, however, was insulate the public service employees from some of the basic
economic changes that did affect the middle and working classes. Bob Short raised ticket
prices twice above and beyond a correction for inflation between 1961 and 1969, with the
result that by the last two years of the Senators’ existence they were home to the highest
ticket prices in the league, despite only one winning season and a failure to ever finish
less than 15.5 games out of first. The result of the final ticket price increase in 1969 was
a massive drop off in attendance, averaging over 178,000 fewer fans per year in the
team’s final two years in D.C. The most probable cause of this was that Short had priced
out those middle and working class fans who would have willingly attended a game, even
if it was to see the lowly Senators. Much as there seemed to be an invisible population
threshold for supporting more than one team, there also seemed to be a price above which
not even the lure of seeing former Senator Harmon Killebrew or Oakland slugger Reggie
Jackson try to best Mantle’s legendary home run was worth the price.
The uniqueness of Washington’s situation, combined with the rather antagonistic
practices of Bob Short, would serve to emphasize, and perhaps even strengthen, certain
social divisions that were evident in the city; exactly the opposite effect on the
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community that the Dodgers and Braves had on Brooklyn and Milwaukee. Like Walter
O’Malley, Short was confrontational with the municipal government. Unlike O’Malley,
though, Short was intentionally antagonistic toward local elected officials – and toward
the populace in general – because he harbored a desire to move to a more lucrative
situation. By all accounts, O’Malley would have happily remained in New York had an
agreement been reached on a new stadium location that was amenable to both parties.
Short “blamed the lack of support on the proximity of the Orioles, Washington’s high
crime rate, and the District’s predominantly black population.”95 He also began to work
multiple angles, meeting secretly with league officials to plead for relocation assistance
while continuing to insist that he had not purchased the team just to move them
elsewhere. In an attempt to support his accusations that the city, not he or his team’s
front office, was responsible for the failure to provide the Senators with a situation they
could succeed in, Short also antagonized the Armory Board, which held the rights to RFK
Stadium and were seeking back rent of $160,000. As Tom Deveaux explains, the
bickering got so petty – and was so public – that eventually the Washington City Council
sued both parties because the city had been forced to take a loan from the U.S. Treasury
to pay the bond interest for the bonds used to construct RFK in 1960.96 In essence, Short
had maneuvered himself into a perfect position: his host city had found retaining him
undesirable and his fellow owners held enough legitimate concern of the franchise
folding to let him move the team almost anywhere.
Despite the unpleasantness with which Short conducted his business, some of his
concerns were legitimate. Removing the racist overtones from his explanation for why
95
96

Tygiel, Past Time, 195.
Deveaux, Washington Senators, 255.

63
the Senators needed assistance, the reality is that the lack of attendance signaled
something bigger than an off-putting owner and an uncommonly bad team. For most of
baseball’s existence the box office had been the primary source of revenue. Once the
game’s professional organization had stabilized, concessions were added with the team
typically either leasing the sale space or taking a percentage of the profits. While the
broadcasting of games on the radio actually helped to increase the game’s popularity,
television broadcasts began to severely affect attendance, especially as the postwar
economic boom made consumer goods like the TV affordable for the average American.
The effect at the ballpark went beyond declining attendance numbers, and the original
Senators were a prime example of this: “More money was being made from concessions
and from renting Griffith Stadium to the football Redskins than from actual attendance at
baseball games.”97 Alternative, or at least supplemental, revenue streams had become a
necessity for teams and advertising had become a key cog in this modified financial
baseball world.
The marketability of professional teams and players was not at all new in the late
1960s. As far back as Babe Ruth, professional athletes had begun to understand that they
had a commercial viability outside their on-field performance.98 Local entrepreneurs had
also understood that a healthy relationship with teams could be a boon for business.
Brooklyn tailor (and eventual New York City Council President) Abe Stark famously
adorned the wall under the Ebbets Field scoreboard with an ad that said “Hit Sign, Win
Suit. Abe Stark. Brooklyn’s leading clothier.”99 Some local business affiliations became
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even more intimate, such as when the Anheuser-Busch brewery bought the St. Louis
Cardinals in February of 1953.100 While these were solid sources of additional revenue
for the teams, they were a bit beholden to geographic concerns as well, a fact that limited
the financial impact that these businesses could make on the teams. After all, Abe Stark
only owned one clothing store, and it wouldn’t have made much sense for AnheuserBusch to attempt to market themselves is places like Milwaukee or Pittsburgh that
already had a strong local brewery tradition. The revenue that could be gained from local
TV contracts, however, was astronomical in comparison because it allowed large regional
businesses and national chains of all sizes to become involved. Thus the focus, at least of
team ownership, shifted away from strong local allegiance and toward the profit – or at
least stability – provided by regional guarantees of TV and radio money, sometimes paid
in advance. Glen Gendzel argues that this is precisely what lured the Rover Boys to
Atlanta with the Braves, and Deveaux echoes this sentiment in his explanation of Bob
Short’s desire to move the expansion Senators to the Dallas-Fort Worth area.101 By
enhancing the stability of their revenue streams through a reduced dependency on
attendance, franchise owners like Bob Short and Bartholemay’s Rover Boys ended up
presenting local fans with an amazing paradox. On the one hand, the new guaranteed
revenue should have solidified team finances to the point where relocation would no
longer occur. And on this point things proved true; the expansion Senators were the last
team to relocate when they moved to the Dallas-Fort Worth area and became the Rangers
in 1972 – at least until the Expos left Montreal to return to the nation’s capital as the
Nationals in 2005. Expansion became the preferred route, as the league grew in 1961,
100
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1962, 1969, 1977, 1993, and 1998. But this stability did not mean that the threat of
relocation actually abated. The lure of increased revenue, especially if it was advanced or
guaranteed, would remain a significant and tempting force both for teams and for the
cities that wished to gain them. With the newly reshaped revenue pie, both cities and
teams could also focus on providing advantages in one area as a way to lure (or retain)
teams. This, then, is the faux-organic process from which the hostage situation that
Zimbalist writes about emerged. Cities were, for the most part fixed on their ability to
allocate broadcast revenue to teams. In order to prevent their local franchise from being
lured to a new home, cities would have to sweeten the pot somehow, and the answer
almost always revolved around construction of a new, publicly subsidized stadium from
which the team could reap untold fiscal rewards while reducing their own overhead costs.
This became especially important after 1975, as the advent of free agency saw contracts
skyrocket because of baseball’s lack of a salary cap. Thus New York’s refusal to allow
O’Malley the land he desired, Milwaukee’s seemingly innocuous decision to build a
stadium in the hopes of acquiring a professional team, and Washington’s stark illustration
of the volatility and problematic nature of revenue depending upon attendance created a
perfect storm from which the hostage situation cemented itself. And the paradox would
prove remarkably resilient, as cities cherished their grasp of the identity of being “Major
League”, that arch-cachet of cityhood, while simultaneously understanding that the grip
was tenuous at best.102
As I have argued, though, baseball – and sports in general – is not just economics,
although it cannot escape its relationship with the economic aspects of society. There is
also a social and community identity aspect, especially surrounding professional sports.
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The nature of this relationship is best analyzed in places where the loss of a team has
occurred because the discourse surrounding that event is often revealing of the way fans
and locals conceptualized their relationship to the team. As discussed above, Brooklyn
saw the Dodgers as a representative part of their community, nearly inseparable because
achievement formed the basis of the relationship, making success all the more enjoyable.
In Milwaukee, the Braves were found to be a unifying and legitimizing force. A
partitioned city was unified through baseball and was willing to incorporate its larger
state connections in its quest for regional legitimacy. In Washington, D.C., the
relationship between the community and both incarnations of the Senators is more
troubling but also, I would posit, a positive example of community of a different sort.
Using the same framing lens with which Brooklyn and Milwaukee have been
treated, the community identity relationship between the Senators and Washington, D.C.
seems to be exclusionary rather than inclusionary. After all, as Miranda Joseph has
argued, the universality that can be implied in some community settings is often untrue
and the mere “discourse of community” can “legitimate social hierarchies.”103 However,
this does not mean that the existence and experience of the Senators was without its
contribution to a community, rather it means that the type of community that is being
affected may not be as evident. When combined with the earlier discussions about the
affluent public sector employees, the idea of changing revenue streams is indicative of
changing patterns of consumption. As Lizabeth Cohen has argued, “Without discounting
the changing nature of production in shaping the city, by focusing on it exclusively we
may miss the significance of consumption trends and choices in the making of the city,
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and the twentieth-century city in particular.”104 In other words, focusing strictly on the
ways teams intended for fans to consume their products does not always consider, let
alone accurately represent, consumer intentions. Part of the reason that the Senators did
not have the unifying force that the Dodgers or Braves had was because the D.C.
residents who attended the games were there for different reasons. The majority of
Dodgers fans attended games to see their beloved Bums attempt to vanquish and
outperform the rival Giants – local rivalries were played out on the field. Similarly, the
majority of Braves fans attended games at County Stadium to participate in their new
legitimized “Major League” identity – winning was a phenomenal bonus. But for
Senators crowds, the majority of them were not there to see the home team. In
Washington, D.C., demography superseded geography. In a rather fitting parallel, the
community with whom the Senators engaged most were what we have come today to call
the “Nation” fans (i.e. Red Sox Nation). Doris Kearns Goodwin writes of being
introduced to “the invisible community of baseball” at a very young age when at a park
one day she met a fellow Dodger fan who was from New Jersey.105 “Invisible” is a bit
problematic, as fans who literally wear their allegiances on their clothing are anything but
invisible. The better term for this community, I’d argue, is decentralized. (Nationalized
probably represents the modern community of sports fans better – hence Red Sox Nation
and Cowboy Nation, among others – but its existence is dependent on the advent of truly
nationalized personal communication in the form of the internet, cellular phones, and
social media.) As the country’s population grew and dispersed to fill in new urban
centers, those who had grown up rooting for one team or another had the choice of taking
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their allegiance with them, as the public sector employees of Washington, D.C. often did,
or realigning themselves with their new local team, as Goodwin and her family did.106
For fans, participant culture began to be just as much about whether they individually had
“a” team as it was about whether there was a professional team nearby. Cohen’s
emphasis on the consumption aspect of cities is reinforced then, as the changes in fans’
consumption habits mirrored the change in revenue streams for teams. As the community
of fans grew to include those outside the immediate geography of the home park, the
focus on achievement by fans increased. “Home,” Amy Bass argues, became
“blurry...The importance of the idea of the local, if not its actuality,” was now
paramount.107

Perhaps the most amazing aspect to the history of baseball in Washington, D.C.,
is the fact that somehow the city managed to lose two franchises in a decade after a
lengthy and acrimonious battle between second Senators owner Bob Short and the city,
endured on-field futility for the better part of three decades, and still did not draw enough
ire from the men on Capitol Hill to truly threaten baseball’s antitrust exemption. As
Zimbalist has argued, the antitrust exemption enjoyed by MLB is the cornerstone of their
ability to replicate the hostage situation in every city with a major league team. Tom
Deveaux points out that team owners were aware of the unpleasantness that accompanied
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any relocation talks, but were especially wary of the true nature of the process when it
came to relocation in Washington: “The main fear of American League owners was that
the politicians might take umbrages at the displacement of this [the Senators] ballclub in
particular. Many of them were already upset enough that the Dodgers and Giants had left
New York. In 1958, Brooklyn Congressman Emanuel Celler introduced a bill that would
bring all sports under antitrust laws.”108 Celler’s bill never amounted to a serious threat
to baseball’s special status. In fact, the closest that baseball would come to having its
antitrust privileges revoked would be the inquiry of Senator Estes Kefauver regarding the
American and National Leagues’ treatment of the upstart Continental League, which,
when put to a vote in the Senate in 1960, was narrowly defeated. Where once the team
owners had voted purely out self-interest and self-protection (and, occasionally in the
case of preventing Bill Veeck from carrying out one of his eccentric ideas, out of distaste
and spite), with the case of relocation for the new Senators they affirmed the need for
swift action. Regardless of his other shortcomings, Red Sox owner Tom Yawkey held
the rather patriotic view that the nation’s capital should not be without baseball. Former
Red Sox hitting legend (and then-manager of the Washington Senators) Ted Williams
convinced him of the need for relocation. Similarly, Charles Finley, owner of the nowOakland Athletics, after exhausting his network of contacts for possible buyers of the
team, switched his vote from abstention to assent, guaranteeing that Short would be
allowed to relocate to the Dallas-Fort Worth area.109
The relocation of the expansion Senators would have two major repercussions for
Washington, D.C. The first was that the city would be without professional baseball for
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thirty-three years, until the relocated Montreal Expos came to town as the Washington
Nationals in 2005. The Expos were the first MLB franchise to relocate since the
expansion Senators had become the Texas Rangers. Yet the league had grown three
different times (1977, 1993, 1998) since the Senators had left town, even returning to
Seattle in 1977, only eight years after the 1969 expansion Seattle Pilots were so poorly
received that they were relocated to Milwaukee as the Brewers after only a single season.
Probably, the memory of the acrimonious departure and memories of the threat that
Congress posed to the exclusivity of MLB ownership was compounded by the emergence
of free agency and the skyrocketing player salaries that began to take effect in the mid1970s. The hostage approach to park construction had directly or indirectly resulted in
either renovations or an entirely new ballpark over those thirty-three years for every
team, so a return to Washington had to be timed and executed in such a manner as to try
and limit congressional interest in anything beyond the box score. It may be a cynical
interpretation, but the post-9/11 world seemed to be the perfect setting for this return.
Not only was Congress busy addressing national security and a quest for retribution, but
there was also relatively fresh on the minds of Americans the image of President George
W. Bush throwing out the first pitch of Game 3 of the 2001 World Series in New York.
The national pastime, which had lost so much ground to football over the previous three
decades, was back in the spotlight and offered a relatively seamless reentry into the
nation’s capital.
Yet even Washington, D.C., a metropolitan area roughly the size of Boston or St.
Louis, was able to minimize the effects of losing their ballclub – and thus their “Major
League” status – twice. Partly, this was because professional football had made massive
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gains in popularity since the advent of television, and Washington was gifted with a good
team in the Redskins that had not only success but also a budding rivalry with
“America’s Team,” the Dallas Cowboys. As the ties that linked the sports fan
community to a team became less reliant upon geography, the symbolic value of a city
having a team increased. However, growth of American professional sports was so rapid
in the final quarter of the 20th century that baseball was no longer an exclusive signifier
of “Major League” status. Cities like Portland (NBA), Buffalo (NFL, NHL), and Tampa
Bay (NFL) found themselves legitimized through sports other than baseball. For those
cities that did retain a baseball team, however, Washington had unwittingly set the stage
for a new series of stadium development projects, all which would be funded at least
partly by public financing. When the city constructed District of Columbia Stadium in
1961 – later renamed Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Stadium (RFK) – they broke
conceptual ground by conceiving of the space as a multisport venue.110 The result for
baseball would be that the game began to be played more frequently in stadiums
unaffectionately known as “concrete donuts” – Veterans Stadium in Philadelphia,
Riverfront Stadium in Cincinnati, and Three Rivers Stadium in Pittsburgh were among
some of the most recognizable of these edifices. Constructed to, at least theoretically,
house both professional football and professional baseball comfortably, the former sport
was much more acclimated to the oval shape of the structures, which lacked the design
character of a Wrigley or a Fenway and often boasted Astroturf as a playing surface.
Economically, however, these venues addressed certain specifically urban problems that
had resulted from the suburbanization of professional sports. Bruce Kuklick’s case study
of Shibe Park in Philadelphia stands as a model for a more national urban problem of
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neighborhood reconfiguration in the wake of suburban flight. “From the time baseball
businessmen constructed their parks until the 1960s, the buildings were central to
community activity in the United States. Because few large public facilities existed,
entrepreneurs frequently selected baseball stadiums to house civic functions.”111 Not
only were baseball stadiums large public facilities, but often they were also centrally
located and easily accessible to pedestrian and mass transit traffic. With the increased
popularity of the automobile and the expansion to the suburbs, the neighborhoods
surrounding parks deteriorated, occupied mostly by those who could not afford to
relocate to the suburbs. Unfortunately, this deterioration also had a strong racial
component. Falling property values made the central neighborhoods more affordable for
African-American wageworkers, and as more blacks moved in racial tensions at and
around games escalated. Although it is Kuklick who most succinctly describes the issue
as it stood in Philadelphia, he underscores the fact that the issue was prevalent in many
cities that had once housed their ball clubs in the heart of downtown. “The problems of
the franchise and the neighborhood were not unique. In a 1972 federal study, the director
of Housing and Urban Affairs mentioned seven cities with similar miseries in the 1960s.
Six of seven were homes to professional baseball; they represented eleven of the original
sixteen major league teams and five abandoned parks.”112 The issue of abandoned parks
was easily combated, as the ground was either repossessed or sold with the park itself
being razed and the land repurposed. But the lack of these central, heavily racialized
neighborhoods as viable locations for new stadiums limited the number of possible
locations and drove the interest in the multisport “concrete donuts.” Some newer urban
111
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areas, like Kansas City, avoided the multisport approach and kept their venues for
baseball and football separate, and by the early 1990s the luster of efficiency was no
longer enough to willingly construct these venues. Washington had led the way in
multisport stadiums, but it would be neighboring Baltimore that, faced with serious
economic hardship, would choose to incorporate stadium construction as part of a plan
for urban economic redevelopment, despite steadily rising construction costs.113
Brooklyn and the Dodgers illustrated the startling reality that franchises could
relocate at any time, regardless of financial health or on-field performance. Milwaukee
(and Atlanta) and the Braves provided evidence of the profitability of relocation to a city
previously without a team, not to mention one that had already built or was willing to
build a stadium to accommodate a team. Washington, D.C., however, not only
underscored the importance of alternative revenue streams for teams’ financial stability,
thus underwriting the “need” for a stadium subsidy, but it also would eventually lead to
cities transforming their own ideas of how fans consumed sports. With a lack of
supporting evidence – in fact with a steadily growing amount of evidence to the contrary
– cities began to incorporate rhetoric of economic redevelopment and health around the
construction of stadiums built with public money. Thus Zimbalist is only partly correct
in describing the stadium finance debate as a hostage situation. The cities repeatedly opt
in to a paradigm of understanding about stadium economics that is generally
unsupportable, as well as a belief in the psychological benefits of being a “Major
League” city that is not universal, but rather specific and unique to each city based on a
number of factors, primary among them the demographic makeup of the city. In the end,
113
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the teams and leagues are not the only hostage takers – cities hold themselves hostage as
well.
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Conclusion
The goal of this paper has been to illustrate the importance of non-economic
influences on the way baseball as a business has interacted with cities. Specifically, I
hope to have illustrated that in communities who lost a team to relocation, the memory of
that team – at least as far as it is discussed in works by people who were fans of the team
– reveals how each community engaged with that team as a part of its larger community
identity. Each of these instances, Brooklyn, Milwaukee, and Washington, D.C., revealed
a unique relationship of the team to community identity that, while unlike the others in
experience, all contributed to reinforce the hostage paradigm that has become ubiquitous
when a professional team is in the market for a new stadium. Analysis of this common
thread among cases that are so clearly different is necessary because it can better
illustrate how the team’s role in the formation of community identity has impacted the
stadium financing process and discussion. Over time, this truth has been either
obfuscated by rhetoric or simply forgotten. Much of the fear that underlies the hostage
dialogue of stadium financing originates from a time when professional sports, especially
baseball, were much more regionally anchored and the community identity surrounding
these teams was less national. Scrutiny of this time period is therefore critical, as
contemporary manifestations of community identity represent a much-changed
landscape, both in the ways that fans consume professional sports and what that
consumption represents in society at large. These changes also remain unacknowledged
in much of the stadium financing discourse. The weight of the threats, the concerns of
cities, and the rhetoric used in this discourse all are either anachronistic or economically
dubious.
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One major consideration that needs to be more thoroughly taken into account
when discussing publicly funded stadiums is the idea that fan-decentralization has greatly
affected not only the self-identification process of communities, but it has also served to
mute possible opposition to stadium construction to some degree. Cultural critic and
humorist Joe Queenan has written that, “Fan support must be based on one of two
criteria. Either you grew up in a specific locality and inherited a congenital municipal
connection to the team, or you grew up somewhere else but rooted for your father’s
team.”114 Humor aside, the conditions that Queenan mentions do reflect reality to a large
degree. Before television ownership became a nationwide standard that made it easier to
follow a team from across the country, and especially before the rise of the Internet,
geography was the strongest tie between fans and their teams. As Dodgers fans
illustrated through their vociferous and plentiful objections to the team’s relocation, some
teams could become so institutionalized within a community that to relocate them was to
scar the infrastructure of that community. Specifically because of the way Brooklynites
reacted to the Dodger relocation – by declaring loudly and openly to anyone that would
listen that Walter O’Malley was a traitor of biblical proportions – the story that they
conveyed became another example in baseball history where legend became fact. Much
as Babe Ruth supposedly called his own shot in the 1932 World Series against the Cubs,
every city that did not do whatever it could to retain its teams would be subject to the
same humiliating betrayal by team ownership that Dodger fans suffered. In the world of
non-academic publication on baseball, books on the history of the Brooklyn Dodgers are
probably second in plurality to ghostwritten (auto)biographies. In the last five years
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alone, two new biographies of O’Malley have emerged.115 Yet like the legend of Ruth’s
called shot, the story of doom and gloom for cities that lost or lose teams was apocryphal.
The Brooklyn experience was not normative, but unique. In hindsight, this should have
been obvious to contemporaries, as the amount of ink directed venomously at Horace
Stoneham and the Giants is far less that what O’Malley suffered. If a sister borough did
not even react as strongly as Brooklyn did then it stands to reason that Brooklyn’s
reaction was in fact a product of that borough’s idiosyncrasies. As I argued above, the
relocation of the Braves from Milwaukee to Atlanta is a more definite betrayal than what
O’Malley had done. However, because of the limited exposure to professional baseball
in Milwaukee there was not enough time to develop the same institutionalized
relationship that would result in a reaction of the same magnitude as what occurred in
Brooklyn. Moreover, Milwaukee used the Braves as a unifying aspect of their
community identity. Not only did it help merge disparate neighborhoods within the city,
but it also included people from all over Wisconsin, like my grandma. This inclusionary
reality, as opposed to Brooklyn’s insular disposition concerning their team, showed that
geography still greatly influenced ideas of community identity, but the dense and
centralized nature of the team (and even the ballpark itself) was not as crucial.
Washington D.C., then, is the ultimate contrast to Brooklyn, as the relationship between
the city and the team was still based on those residents that lived in the metropolitan area,
but the Senators were not a strongly supported or projected part of D.C.’s identity.
Rather, they became a utility for different segments of the population; the affluent public
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service sector especially using attendance at the game either as a status symbol or to
reconnect with the team of their youth when it came to town. Washington’s two
instances of relocation are instructive in understanding how the idea of the team “nation”
was built. Able to maintain connection to teams all across the country, fans became less
connected to the community of their immediate location and more connected to the
“invisible” community of baseball. Through the advent and expansion of television
(both cable and satellite), the internet, smart phones, tablets, and especially through
targeted products like MLB.tv, the main consumer of professional baseball has been
offered a myriad of recourse options should they become separated in some way from
their favorite team or if they grew up a fan of a team other than the regional options.
Because of the deliverability of the product, the local fan voice does not stand in united
opposition to the hostage tactics of team ownership that could be expected were
Brooklyn’s case really an example of the psychological effects of team relocation. It is
probably too sinister, and quite frankly probably too much of an overestimation of
MLB’s business acumen and foresight, to suggest that the ability to “plug in” to your
respective team’s “nation” at will is a way to reduce opposition to public financing of
stadiums. The fact remains, though, that the resulting situation benefits team ownership
greatly and owners as a whole likely have little desire to change this process.
The decentralization, or nationalization, of sports’ main consumer is not the only
consideration that should be derived from these case studies. The uncomfortable fact for
urban residents is that cities have themselves greatly contributed to their own hostage
situation. To begin with, they remain unfazed by the plethora of articles and monographs
by economists like Zimbalist, Roger Noll, Arthur Johnson, and Martin Greenberg, all of
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whom find the claims that stadiums are lightning rods for economic growth and
expansion to be at least dubious if not entirely false.116 Furthermore, each city that has
called ownership’s bluff, as New York did concerning the Dodgers, has lost their team.
This has been routinely interpreted to be an indisputable law of professional sports, even
though it has not happened in professional baseball since the Dodgers. Nate Silver would
argue that just because this observable phenomenon is the only outcome that has
happened, it does not mean that it is the only possible outcome.117 Yet city after city has
equated the construction of a new stadium with the panacea to prevent relocation even
though that too has evidence (in Milwaukee and Washington, D.C.) that points to the
contrary. The ascent of professional football in the 1960s and 1970s actually provided
the first possible change in the paradigm as multisport venues were constructed out of a
desire for efficiency as well as a desire to prevent the pockets of urban deterioration that
had accompanied almost all the stadiums built in the first quarter of the 20th century. The
aesthetics of places like Riverfront Stadium and RFK were, however, in a word, horrible.
A desire for efficiency had superseded any identifying local character that the old
stadiums had. In a move that will probably be understood by future generations to be the
most self-defeating decision in the stadium subsidy debates, cities like Baltimore, San
Francisco, and most recently Miami, incorporated the construction of new stadiums into
larger urban revitalization and redevelopment projects. By reconceptualizing the
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economic role of sports teams in the local economy – while still failing to heed the
evidence of their limited positive impact – cities reoriented the paradigm in favor of the
teams and leagues. Surely places like Oriole Park at Camden Yards and AT&T Park in
San Francisco’s South of Market neighborhood can serve as tourist attractions to
supplement local attendance, especially by drawing in tourists from the various team
“nations,” but the economic efficacy of this approach is uncertain, especially since
tourism alone does not fill a ballpark. After all, revenue streams were already reducing
the critical nature of attendance when the expansion Senators left Washington, D.C. in
1972. Building parks that a quarter century later cost an order of magnitude more as part
of a supposed revitalization project for a city is rife with problematic logic. But this
serves to underscore the power of the psychological benefits that Zimbalist and the others
do not take into consideration. In the face of increasing evidence of ballparks as
ineffectual (at best) economic investments, when threatened with the loss of a
professional team cities still repeatedly choose to find a way to finance the new structure
and then effectively hand it over to the team in question which is able to profit
handsomely from its new home. Call it boosterism, call it civic pride, call it fanaticism,
the name is inconsequential: cities routinely decide that sunk-cost stadiums are a fair
price to keep their team and the tag of “Major League.”
Finally, then, there is the question of whether or not remedies rooted purely in
microeconomic theory like those proposed by Zimbalist can be effectively applied to a
hostage paradigm constructed and reinforced by both economic and psychological
considerations. In Baseball and Billions, Zimbalist suggests four main avenues of
remedy to minimize the economic inequalities that are present in the game: regulation by
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an outside entity, dissolution of baseball’s anti-trust exemption, increased revenue
sharing, and lasting labor peace. That particular volume, however, is over twenty years
old, and since its publication the 1994 players’ strike occurred, resulting in a response by
Commissioner Bud Selig that has secured labor peace through at least 2016. Moreover,
MLB has addressed some of the revenue sharing issues by introducing the luxury tax in
1997 and increasing its national revenue streams, which had stagnated in the late 1980s
and early 1990s.118 Yet concerns over regulation and anti-trust issues remain. In 2003’s
May The Best Team Win, Zimbalist once again calls for both of these remedies in order to
address the new set of inequalities that surround the much more complicated revenue
streams of 21st century baseball. Interestingly, implementation of either of these
approaches leads Zimbalist to the same conclusion: a radical increase in the number of
MLB teams into the neighborhood of forty or more. In the case of a regulatory
commission, owners – especially those in the largest media markets – would likely back
an increased number of teams so that their current contribution to revenue sharing would
not dramatically increase while teams in smaller media markets would enjoy a more
competitive product as the increased number of players could dilute talent enough to
prevent hoarding by high-revenue clubs like the Yankees and Dodgers. Regulation,
however, is unlikely because baseball has “recovered” economically. May The Best
Team Win begins with the story of Commissioner Selig pleading with Congress for
assistance because of baseball’s supposedly unhealthy financials. Considering the wide
berth that baseball had given Washington since the Senators had departed, Selig’s move
was either foolish or arrogant or both, but it was the last major dialogue concerning
possible federal intervention in the economy of the game. (Congress has since spent the
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majority of its time with MLB agonizing over the presence of performance enhancing
drugs.) Economically, baseball has bounced back again to the point that cities like
Minneapolis/St. Paul, Miami, and Atlanta either have built or have agreed to build new
stadiums for their teams. Moreover, the limits on profitability would prevent ownership
from any voluntary construction of a regulatory commission. Similarly, owners, players,
and fans alike do not hold much ire nor do they stand to benefit greatly from the
dissolution of MLB’s anti-trust exemption. For the owners, the exemption is part of the
shield that allows them to participate in the “creative accounting” whereby they can own
both a team and its affiliated RSN, charge themselves any price they wish to show their
own team’s games, and then claim that they suffered losses or reduced revenue, thereby
minimizing their contribution to the revenue sharing pot. After free agency was awarded
to Andy Messersmith in December of 1975, average player salaries have steadily risen
for 40 years and top-paid players regularly compete with European soccer stars for the
richest sports contracts in the world. Since the reserve clause was the main grievance of
players under the yoke of baseball’s exempt status, they likely have no interest in trustbusting either.119 Finally, fans’ likeliest gain from the removal of the exemption would
be more equalized and stabilized ticket prices, a minimal gain at best considering a die
hard can watch nearly every one of the 2,430 regular season games and all of the playoff
series from the comfort their own home.
The one entity, however, that could benefit from the exemption’s removal would
be the cities. The ability to sue under antitrust law could be an initial step in protecting
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cities from the hostage situation concerning relocation and park financing. However, as I
have argued above cities do not always make the most economically sound and pragmatic
choices. The tenor of the discourse could completely change but produce the same
results as cities continue to build new parks and hand them over to teams. Moreover,
providing the cities with recourse to sue could deflate the artificially high value of
franchises to the point where are larger number of prospective owners could afford to
purchase a team. It is uncertain how massive expansion might alter the fan experience of
the game, but there are cities like San Jose, Portland, New Orleans, and Columbia, South
Carolina who have expressed interest in the acquisition of an MLB team. But with a
rapid, sizeable expansion comes the question as to whether or not an illogical process like
the stadium-hostage situation would actually be eliminated, or if it would instead be
exacerbated as more and more cities were forced to support teams. As the beginning of
Chapter 1 pointed out, the ability of a metropolitan area to support a professional team
seemed to be more strongly correlated with population than the team’s on-field
achievements. The relocation wave of the 1950s-1970s was initiated by cities like
Boston, St. Louis, and Philadelphia realizing that they could support one, but not two or
more teams. It stands to reason then that there exists such a threshold for the support of
one team as well. If the league were to expand to forty or more teams, would one or
more of the expansion teams be placed in a city that was unable to support it once the
“newness” wore off? And if so, could it not be surmised that the wave of team
relocations might be triggered once again, but this time with the hostage paradigm firmly
in place and supported by its own precedent?
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The goal of this project has been to show that the simultaneous existence of both
economic and psychological concerns in the realm of sports – especially professional
sports – require their simultaneous consideration. Economic decisions must sometimes
find their explanation(s) in psychological motivations and vice versa. Exploring either in
a compartmentalized manner can be illuminating, but is limited in its ability to provide
prescriptive answers to problems that arise. Policymakers and fan bases alike would be
well served to remember this going forward.
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Boston Braves
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
TOTAL

Wins

St. Louis Browns
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
TOTAL

Wins

Philadelphia
Athletics
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
TOTAL

Wins

Losses
68
65
67
81
86
91
75
83
76
64
756

85
89
85
72
68
62
79
71
78
89
778

Win Percentage
.444
.422
.441
.529
.558
.595
.487
.539
.494
.418
.492

Place Finish
6
6
6
4
3
1
4
4
4
7

80
65
70
88
95
94
101
96
102
90
100
981

Win Percentage
.484
.570
.539
.439
.376
.394
.360
.369
.338
.412
.350
.418

Place Finish
6
1
3
7
8
6
7
7
8
7
8

Win Percentage

Place Finish

Losses
72
89
81
66
59
59
53
58
52
64
54
707
Losses
49
72
52
49
78
84
81
52
70
79
59
51
776

105
82
98
105
76
70
73
102
84
75
95
103
1068

.318
.468
.347
.318
.506
.545
.526
.338
.455
.513
.383
.331
.420

8
5
8
8
5
4
5
8
6
4
7
8
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Chicago Cubs
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
TOTAL

Wins

Chicago White
Sox
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
TOTAL

Wins

Losses
74
75
98
82
69
64
61
64
62
77
65
64
72
927

79
79
56
71
85
90
93
89
92
77
89
90
81
1071
Losses

82
71
71
74
70
51
63
60
81
81
89
94
91
978

72
83
78
80
84
101
91
94
73
73
65
60
63
1017

Win Percentage
.484
.487
.636
.536
.448
.416
.396
.418
.403
.500
.422
.416
.471
.463

Place Finish
5
4
1
3
6
8
8
7
8
5
7
7
6

Win Percentage

Place Finish

.532
.461
.477
.481
.455
.336
.409
.390
.526
.526
.578
.610
.591
.490

4
7
6
5
6
8
6
6
4
3
3
3
3
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Win % of Best and Worst
MLB Teams, 1943-1955

Best Team Win %

Worst Team Win%

1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953

.682
.682
.636
.675
.630
.626
.630
.636
.636
.627
.682

.318
.399
.299
.318
.383
.336
.325
.338
.338
.273
.325

1954

.721

.331

1955

.640

.344

Boston Braves
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
TOTAL

St. Louis Browns
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
TOTAL

Attendance
271, 289
208, 691
374, 178
969, 673
1, 277, 361
1, 455, 439
1, 081, 795
944, 391
487, 475
281, 278
7, 351, 570

Attendance
214, 392
508, 644
482, 986
526, 435
320, 474
335, 564
270, 936
247, 131
293, 790
518, 796
297, 238
4, 016, 386

League
Attendance Rank
8
8
6
6
4
1
6
7
8
8

Home Wins

League
Attendance Rank
8
6
7
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8

Home Wins

38
38
36
45
50
45
43
46
42
31
414

44
54
47
35
29
34
36
27
24
42
23
395

Home Losses
39
40
38
31
27
31
34
31
35
45
351

Home Losses
33
23
27
41
48
42
41
47
53
35
54
444
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Philadelphia
Athletics
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
TOTAL

Chicago Cubs
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
TOTAL

Attendance
376, 735
505, 322
462, 631
621, 793
911, 566
945, 076
816, 514
309, 805
465, 469
627, 100
362, 113
304, 666
6, 708, 790

Attendance
508, 247
640, 110
1, 036, 386
1, 342, 970
1, 364, 039
1, 237, 792
1, 143, 139
1, 165, 944
894, 415
1, 024, 826
763, 658
748, 183
878, 500
12, 748, 209

League Attendance
Rank
6
5
8
7
6
5
6
7
7
7
7
8

League Attendance
Rank
2
2
1
2
3
5
5
4
6
2
6
5
4

Home Wins
27
39
39
31
39
36
52
29
38
45
27
29
431

Home Wins
36
35
49
44
36
35
33
35
32
42
43
40
43
503

Home Losses
51
37
35
46
38
41
25
48
41
32
50
47
491

Home Losses
38
42
26
33
43
42
44
42
45
35
34
37
33
494
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Chicago White Sox
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
TOTAL

Brooklyn Dodgers
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
TOTAL

Attendance
508, 962
563, 539
657, 981
983, 403
876, 948
777, 844
937, 151
781, 330
1, 328, 234
1, 231, 675
1, 191, 353
1, 231, 629
1, 175, 684
12, 245, 733

Wins

League Attendance
Rank
4
3
3
6
5
6
5
5
4
3
2
3
6

Losses
81
63
87
96
94
84
97
89
97
96
105
92
98
93
84
1356

72
91
67
60
60
70
57
65
60
57
49
62
55
61
70
956

Home Wins
40
41
44
40
32
27
32
35
39
44
41
45
49
509

Win Percentage
.529
.409
.565
.615
.610
.545
.630
.578
.618
.627
.682
.597
.641
.604
.545
.587

Home Losses
36
36
29
38
43
48
45
42
38
33
36
32
28
484

Place Finish
3
7
3
2
1
3
1
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
3
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New York Giants
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
TOTAL

Wins

New York
Yankees
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
TOTAL

Wins

Losses
55
67
78
61
81
78
73
86
98
92
70
97
80
67
69
1152

98
87
74
93
73
76
81
68
59
62
84
57
74
87
85
1158

Losses
98
83
81
87
97
94
97
98
98
95
99
103
96
97
98
1421

56
71
71
67
57
60
57
56
56
59
52
51
58
57
56
884

Win Percentage
.359
.435
.513
.396
.526
.506
.474
.558
.624
.597
.455
.630
.519
.435
.448
.498

Place Finish
8
5
5
8
4
5
5
3
1
2
5
1
3
6
6

Win Percentage

Place Finish

.636
.539
.533
.565
.630
.610
.630
.636
.636
.617
.656
.669
.623
.630
.636
.616

1
3
4
3
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
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Brooklyn Dodgers
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
TOTAL

New York Giants
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
TOTAL

Attendance
661, 739
605, 905
1, 059, 220
1, 796, 824
1, 807, 526
1, 398, 976
1, 633, 747
1, 185, 896
1, 282, 628
1, 088, 704
1, 163, 419
1, 020, 531
1, 033, 589
1, 213, 562
1, 028, 258
17, 980, 524

Attendance
466, 095
674, 483
1, 016, 468
1, 219, 873
1, 600, 793
1, 459, 269
1, 218, 446
1, 008, 878
1, 059, 539
984, 840
811, 518
1, 155, 067
824, 112
629, 179
653, 923
14, 782, 613

League Attendance
Rank
1
3
2
1
1
4
1
2
1
1
2
4
2
2
5

Home Wins

League Attendance
Rank
5
1
3
3
2
3
4
6
2
3
5
2
6
8
8

Home Wins

46
37
58
56
52
36
48
48
49
45
60
45
56
52
43
731

34
39
47
38
45
37
43
44
50
50
38
53
44
37
37
636

Home Losses
31
39
30
22
25
41
29
30
29
33
17
32
21
25
34
438

Home Losses
43
36
30
39
31
40
34
32
28
27
39
23
35
40
40
517
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New York Yankees
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
TOTAL

Milwaukee Braves
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
TOTAL

Attendance
618, 330
789, 995
881, 845
2, 265, 512
2, 178, 937
2, 373, 901
2, 283, 676
2, 081, 380
1, 950, 107
1, 629, 665
1, 537, 811
1, 475, 171
1, 490, 138
1, 491, 784
1, 497, 134
24, 555, 386

Wins

League Attendance
Rank
1
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Losses
92
89
85
92
95
92
86
88
83
86
84
88
86
1146

62
65
69
62
59
62
70
66
71
76
78
74
76
890

Home Wins
54
47
48
47
55
50
54
53
56
49
50
54
52
49
48

Win Percentage
.597
.578
.552
.597
.617
.597
.551
.571
.539
.531
.519
.543
.531
.563

Home Losses
23
31
28
30
22
27
23
24
22
28
27
23
25
28
29

Place Finish
2
3
2
2
1
1
2
2
4
5
6
5
5
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Milwaukee Braves
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
TOTAL

Washington
Senators (19431960)
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
TOTAL

Attendance
1, 826, 397
2, 131, 388
2, 005, 836
2, 046, 381
2, 215, 404
1, 971, 101
1, 749, 112
1, 497, 799
1, 101, 441
766, 921
773, 018
910, 911
555, 584
19, 551, 243

Wins

League Attendance
Rank
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
4
5
8
9
6
10

Losses

84
64
87
76
64
56
50
67
62
78
76
66
53
59
55
61
63
73
1194

Home Wins
45
43
46
47
45
48
49
51
45
49
45
45
44
602

Win Percentage

69
90
67
78
90
97
104
87
92
76
76
88
101
95
99
93
91
81
1574

.549
.416
.565
.494
.416
.366
.325
.435
.403
.506
.500
.429
.344
.383
.357
396
.409
.474
.429

Home Losses
31
34
31
29
32
29
29
26
32
32
36
36
37
414

Place Finish

2
8
2
4
7
7
8
5
7
5
5
6
8
7
8
8
8
5
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Washington
Senators (19611971)
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
TOTAL

Washington
Senators (19431960)
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
TOTAL

Wins

Losses

61
60
56
62
70
71
76
65
86
70
63
740

Attendance
574, 694
525, 235
652, 660
1, 027, 216
850, 758
795, 254
770, 745
699, 697
695, 167
699, 457
595, 594
503, 542
425, 238
431, 647
457, 079
475, 288
615, 372
743, 404
11, 538, 047

Win Percentage

100
101
106
100
92
88
85
96
76
90
96
1030

.379
.373
.346
.383
.432
.447
.472
.404
.531
.432
.396
.417

League Attendance
Rank

Home Wins

3
4
4
5
7
6
7
6
6
6
6
7
8
8
8
8
8
8

44
40
46
38
36
29
26
35
32
42
39
37
28
32
28
33
34
32
631

Place Finish

9
10
10
9
8
8
6
10
4
6
5

Home Losses
32
37
31
38
41
48
51
42
44
35
36
41
49
45
49
44
43
45
751
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Washington
Senators (19611971)
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
TOTAL

Attendance
597, 287
729, 775
535, 604
600, 106
560, 083
576, 260
770, 868
546, 661
918, 106
824, 789
655, 156
7, 314, 695

League
Attendance Rank
10
8
10
10
9
10
8
10
6
8
11

Home Wins
33
27
31
31
36
42
40
34
47
40
35
396

Home Losses
46
53
49
50
45
36
40
47
34
41
46
487
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